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COMMENT
LIBERALIZATION OF HIGH PERFORMANCE
COMPUTER EXPORT CONTROLS UNDER THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: BALANCING
NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
INTERESTS
Mark D. Gursky'
The United States entered the 1990s in the midst of a recession, with
an unemployment rate peaking at 7.5%' and a Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth rate of only 3%.' Within the past five years, however, the
United States has made a dramatic turnaround . The current unem-
ployment rate is 4.1 %,4 GDP growth rate is 5.8%, and the inflation rate
is 2.2%.6 Trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System
(NASDAQ) are at all time highs7 as investors continue to ride out the
surge of the bull market and a stable and growing economy.9
IJ.D. candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 403 (118th ed. 1998) (providing a fifty-year summary of the U.S. unemployment
rate).
2. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 461 (119th ed. 1999) (noting that GDP growth rate between 1990 and 1991 was
only 3%).
3. See William M. Daley, Remarks at the North American International Trade Corri-
dor Partnership Summit (Sept. 24, 1999) (visited July 22, 2000) <http://osecntl3.osec.
doc.gov/public.nsf/docs/FBA23B191183A40D852567F600539177> (commenting on the
strength of the U.S. economy).
4. See U.S. G.P.O., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 355 (2000).
5. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 453. The GDP growth rate of
5.8% reflects the GDP growth from 1997 to 1998. See id.
6. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 461 (noting that the Con-
sumer Price Index changed 2.2% from December 1998 to December 1999).
7. See Allan Sloan, Halloween Arrives Early, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1999, at 34 (not-
ing that the DOW reached an all time high of 11,326 on August 25, 1999). The flurry of
trading slowed down, however, and the DOW declined nearly 12% by October, 1999. See
id. (commenting on the decline of the Dow Jones Industrial Average to 10,000).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a bull market as "[a]
securities market characterized by rising prices over a prolonged period").
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The high technology industry is a major benefactor and contributor to
the United States's current economic success.'0 In 1998, the value of the
U.S. high technology industry was $680 billion, or approximately eight
percent of U.S. GDP." In the same year, U.S. companies sold $230 bil-
lion dollars worth of computers and computer hardware.12 High technol-
ogy sales also account for over thirty-five percent of the nation's eco-
nomic growth between 1995 and 1997.13
The economy's strength is largely attributed to a strong foreign de-
mand for U.S.-produced goods. 14 U.S. high technology producers, for ex-
ample, receive approximately fifty percent of their revenues from exports
to foreign markets." The increase in exports translates into more jobs in
the United States.16 Economists estimate that for every one billion dol-
lars of goods exported, 20,000 new jobs are created. 7
As the United States enters the next millennium, public policy makers
are taking steps to ensure that the economy continues to roar into the
next century." The recent trend is to remove obstacles from the exporta-tion of goods to foreign markets, especially restraints on commodities
9. See Daley, supra note 3 (reflecting upon the strength of the U.S. economy as the
century ends).
10. See Export Administration Act Reauthorization: Hearing on Emerging Technol-
ogy Issues and Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL
20008982, at *2-*4 (statement of Michael C. Maibach, Vice President of Government Af-
fairs, Intel Corporation) [hereinafter Maibach Testimony] (discussing the role that high
technology plays in the United States's economic success).
11. See id. at 2.
12. See id.
13. See 145 CONG. REC. E827 (daily ed. May 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Hooley)
(discussing the high technology industry's contribution to the U.S. economy).
14. See Juan P. Morillo, The Clinton Administration's New National Export Strategy,
25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1113, 1113-14 (1994) (citing INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMIN., BUSINESS AMERICA: UNVEILING THE NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY 2 (1993))
(noting the role of exports in GNP growth in recent years).
15. See William A. Reinsch, Nonproliferation Export Controls: Looking Toward the
Next Century, Luncheon Address Before the University of Georgia and Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.osce.usia.co.at/wassenaar/
reinsch02.html> (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter Reinsch Speech] (commenting that U.S. high
performance computer corporations export over 50% of sales to foreign markets).
16. See Morillo, supra note 14, at 1113.
17. See id. at 1114 (noting that the Clinton Administration considered this fact in de-
veloping a national export strategy) (citing Why Fear Free Trade? Let's Just Sell Our
Wares, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1993, at 11A).
18. See, e.g., S. 1712, 106th Cong. (1999). Senator Phil Gramm introduced Senate Bill
1712 on October 8, 1999 to reauthorize, and make amendments to, the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979. See id. The purpose of the legislation is to maintain the balance between
national security and commercial interests. See S. REP. No. 106-80, at 1-2 (1999) (summa-
rizing the purpose and need for the legislation).
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that have both military and commercial applications, known as dual-use
commodities.' 9
President Clinton's Administration and Congress are taking affirma-
tive steps toward reforming outdated export control laws that hinder the
exportation of goods to foreign markets.0 Economists estimate that
United States export control laws cost U.S. producers approximately
forty billion dollars each year,2' resulting in a loss of 200,000 to 400,000
jobs annually.
The reforming and loosening of export control laws, however, has re-
ignited the debate between national security and business advocates over
the appropriate level of restrictions imposed on U.S. exports." The re-
19. See Morillo, supra note 14, at 1118-19 (discussing the Clinton Administration's
National Export Strategy and its recommendations to remove outdated export controls
that impede U.S. economic growth); Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730.3
(1999) (defining dual-use commodities). The removal of export restraints on dual-use
products is particularly important to the computer industry, which has become increas-
ingly export-dependent. See Morillo, supra note 14, at 1115 & n.13 (noting that the com-
puter industry relies on exports to finance research that is vital to economic growth).
20. See generally TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, TOWARD A NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY: REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS (1993) (outlining strategies, including legislation, to increase U.S. ex-
ports to foreign markets); see also infra notes 125-202 and accompanying text (describing
export control reforms under the Clinton Administration).
21. See U.S. Export Controls, Other 'Disincentives' Cost Firms $40 Billion a Year,
Study Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 38, at 1608 (Sept. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Disin-
centives] (noting that export controls account for two-thirds to three quarters of export
short falls). But see U.S. Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy and the Role and Re-
sponsibility of the Department of Defense: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed Serv.,
105th Cong. 29 (1998) (statement of Gary Milhollin, Professor, University of Wisconsin
Law School) [hereinafter Milhollin Testimony] (stating that export controls have a minis-
cule impact on the economy and employment).
22. See Morillo, supra note 14, at 1118. But see Jerry J. Jasinowski, Removing U.S.
Export Shackles Will Increase Profits and Jobs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 18, 1994,
at 18 (reporting that export control costs U.S. producers only $20 billion and an estimated
380,000 jobs annually).
23. See Joseph Ira Burkemper, Note, Export Verboten: Export Controls in the United
States and Germany, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 149, 150 (1993) (noting that there has been a
"longstanding tension in export control policy between national security interests-repre-
sented mainly by the Defense Department and the defense industry-and economic inter-
ests-represented partly by the Commerce Department and industrial lobbyists"); see also
Export Administration Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 20009264, at *1-*2
(statement of Dr. Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director, Center for International Trade
and Security, University of Georgia) [hereinafter Cupitt Testimony] (stating that "[f]inding
a prudent balance of the many security, economic, and other interests inherent in nonpro-
liferation export control policy is one of the most difficult tasks facing the U.S. govern-
ment").
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cent computer espionage involving the People's Republic of China,24
bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa,25 and the threat of rogue states26
caused public policy makers and others to reevaluate whether the refor-
mation of export control laws went too far in light of such national secu-
rity threats.17 With the Clinton Administration's July 3, 1999 and Febru-
ary 2, 2000 announcements to further relax export controls on high
performance computers, now the question is whether the Administration
and Congress caved in to business interests at the cost of national secu-
rity.2
This Comment reviews the historical evolution, purpose, and scope of
export control laws in the United States prior to, and through, the post-
Cold War era. This Comment focuses on export control laws affecting
high performance computers and the subsequent concerns with exporting
these goods to foreign markets. This Comment then details the reforma-
tion movement of the 1990s and the latest regulatory changes proposed
by the Clinton Administration for high performance computers. Finally,
this Comment analyzes the economic and national security implications
of these reforms and concludes that the Clinton Administration re-
sponded to business concerns without adequately analyzing the national
security implications of facilitating the proliferation of high performance
computers.
I. THE CONSTANT ATTACK ON EXPORT CONTROL LAWS: FROM STRICT
CONTROLS TO GREATER RECOGNITION OF BUSINESS INTERESTS
The United States export control laws constantly undergo changes in
order to address the national security, economic, and political climate of
the day.29 The current trend moves away from strict controls, as adhered
24. See H.R. REP. No. 105-851, at ii (1999) (reporting on China's espionage of sophis-
ticated nuclear weapons design information). This report is commonly known as the Cox
REPORT and will be referred to as such throughout this Comment.
25. See Dean E. Murphy & Robin Wright, Bombs Rock 2 U.S. Embassies: Attacks in
Kenya, Tanzania Kill 80, Hurt 1, 700, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at Al.
26. For a general discussion of threats posed by rogue states see Lally Weymouth,
Good News for Rogue States, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at A19 (pointing out that rogue
states need computers to develop their nuclear weapons programs).
27. See, e.g., Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 98-150 (rethinking computer export
policies in light of the discovery of Chinese espionage'of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets).
28. See, e.g., Milhollin Testimony, supra note 21, at 31 (criticizing the Administration
for placing business interests ahead of national security interests); see also infra notes 184-
202 (discussing the Clinton Administration's revisions of export control laws in the past
year).
29. Cf Rochelle M. Tarlowe, Note, Deregulating Dual-Use Exports to Russia: Is U.S.
National Security at Risk?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959, 962-63 (1995) (commenting on the
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to following the aftermath of World War II, toward a more liberal export
control policy, placing economic interests on the same plateau as na-
tional security interests. °
A. The Early History of Export Controls: The Export Control Act of
1949 and the Establishment of CoCom
Since the inception of the United States as an independent federal-
state, Congress31 has restricted goods exported to foreign markets.
Early export control laws applied only during times of war.33 But in
1949,m the United States enacted the first comprehensive peacetime
35
legislation regulating exports. 6
1. The Purpose and Scope of the Export Control Act of 1949
The Export Control Act of 1949 sought to protect the United States's
national security interests, forward its foreign policy agenda, and prevent
shortages of critical goods.37 Underlying this export control policy was
repeated amendments to export control laws and events that sparked such amendments).
30. See infra Part I.A-E. (discussing the evolution of export control laws from the af-
termath of World War II to the present).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that "Congress shall have [the] [p]ower
... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"). The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized also that the President of the United States holds constitutional power to regulate
exports. See United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (stat-
ing that the President holds "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations").
32. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, History of
Export Controls (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://chaos.fedworld.gov/bxa/mission.html>. The
First Continental Congress enacted the first American export controls in 1775, prohibiting
all exports to Great Britain. See id. Other commentators suggest that the first export con-
trols appeared during the Spanish-American War of 1898. See Scott C. Whitney & Steven
R. Perles, Judicial Review Under the Export Administration Act, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV.
251, 254 (1996) (noting that export control laws evolved due to the United States's "trans-
formation from an insular country into an international power").
33. See Whitney & Perles, supra note 32, at 251 (stating that export "controls were
originally imposed at the outset of American participation in World War I to prevent
American goods from assisting the nation's enemies during wartime").
34. See L. KUTrEN & BRIAN C. MURPHY, AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES
EXPORT CONTROL LAWS § 1.03 (1989) (asserting that after World War 11 the United
States "realized that there was a symbiotic relationship between technology and the na-
tional defense").
35. See id. (noting that the Export Control Act was the first peacetime export control
policy enacted in to law).
36. See Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2023) (expired 1969).
37. See Export Control Act § 1 (emphasizing the importance of national security, for-
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the desire to scrutinize dual-use" exports to the Soviet Union and other
Warsaw Pact members,39 as well as China, and to prevent any adverse
impact on the United States's national security interests."' Restrictions
on high performance computers were critical to accomplishing the
United States's national security objectives.41
2. Multilateral Control: The Creation of CoCor
The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (Co-
Coin) supplemented the United States domestic export control laws.4
eign relations, and a supply of goods to protect the domestic economy and national secu-
rity).
38. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (1999) (defining dual-
use exports as items that can be used in both military and other strategic applications as
well as commercial applications); see also Robert van den Hoven van Genderen, Coopera-
tion on Export Control Between the United States and Europe: A Cradle of Conflict in
Technology Transfer?, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 391, 394-95 (1989) (noting that
dual-use commodities have strategic military value). Computers are characterized as dual-
use commodities. See Bradley K. Steinbrecher, Comment, The Impact of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's Export Promotion Plan on U.S. Exports of Computers and High- Technology
Equipment, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 675, 682 (1995) (noting that the broad definition of
dual-use technologies subjects many types of computers, electronics, and software com-
modities to export control laws).
39. The Warsaw Pact membership consisted of the Soviet Union, Poland, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Mongolia.
See John F. McKenzie, Implementation of the Core List of Export Controls: Computer and
Software Controls, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 1, 1 n.3 (1992).
40. See id. at 1 (stating that the most important reason for controlling exports was to
scrutinize exports to the Soviet Union and other communist countries); see also Phillip H.
Oettinger, Comment, National Discretion: Choosing CoCOM's Successor and the New
Export Administration Act, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 566 (1994) (stating that ex-
port controls served to restrict the availability of products and technology that could in-
crease the military capabilities of communist countries); Tarlowe, supra note 29, at 959
(noting that during the Cold War the United States sought to restrict exports to the Soviet
Union); Reinsch Speech, supra note 15 (positing that the U.S. Cold War export control
policy limited goods to the Soviet bloc due to the assumption that the goods would be di-
verted to military usage).
41. See SEYMOUR GOODMAN ET AL., BUILDING ON THE BASICS: AN
EXAMINATION OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING EXPORT CONTROL POLICY IN
THE 1990S 1 (1995) (recognizing that for the past fifty years each Congress and Presiden-
tial Administration embraced the need to control computer technology for national secu-
rity purposes); see also GAO, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHANGES IN CONTROLS APPLIED TO
THE EXPORT OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS 4 (1998) [hereinafter CHANGES IN
CONTROLS) ("The Executive Branch has identified high performance computing as hav-
ing applications in such national defense areas as nuclear weapons programs, cryptology,
conventional weapons, and military operations.") (quoting Harold Johnson, Associate Di-
rector, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Af-
fairs Division).
42. See McKenzie, supra note 39, at 1 (explaining that the United States sponsored
the creation of CoCom to promote the policy objectives incorporated in the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949). The original members of CoCom were: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
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CoCom, an informal non-treaty organization, coordinated export control
policies for dual-use commodities to communist bloc countries. 3 CoCom
identified commodities with potential military use, including high per-
formance computers," and placed these commodities on an "Industrial
List., 45  After commodity registration and Industrial List compilation,
CoCom members incorporated the Industrial List into their own national
laws.46 This list restricted the export of dual-use commodities by requir-
ing exporters to seek an export license from CoCom prior to exporting
the listed commodity.47 A single CoCom member could exercise its uni-
lateral veto power to prevent the issuance of a license. 8
The United States adopted an aggressive policy of placing commodi-
ties on the Industrial List,49 causing other member nations to criticize the
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Oettinger, su-
pra note 40, at 559 n.3.
43. See McKenzie, supra note 39, at 1.
44. See Steinbrecher, supra note 38, at 692 (explaining that member nations identified
specific computers and telecommunication equipment that required a license from CoCom
prior to exporting the listed commodity).
45. McKenzie, supra note 39, at 2. Listing items required the members' unanimous
consent. See James Plousadis, Note, Soviet Diversion of United States Technology: The
Circumvention of CoCom and United States Reexport Controls, and Proposed Solutions, 7
FORD. INT'L L.J. 561, 568 (1984). CoCom maintained two other lists for export controls:
an International Atomic Energy List and an International Munitions List. See Cecil Hunt,
Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV.
1285, 1288-91 (1983) (discussing CoCom's listing process).
46. See Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Ef-
forts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete
in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 475 (1994). Actions taken by
CoCom members were not binding on the member states. See Ihor Fedorowycz, Prevent-
ing the Transfer of Militarily Critical Technology to the Soviet Bloc: The Case for Strong
National Security Export Controls, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 53, 73 (1987) (noting
that CoCom decisions were not binding on member nations as a matter of international
law). Any action taken, including the compilation of the Industrial List, had to incorpo-
rate the national laws of each member state. Although CoCom policies were not binding
on member states, CoCom successfully prevented the acquisition of computing technology
by CoCom's adversaries. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1-2.
47. See KuTrEN & MURPHY, supra note 34, at § 1.03 (stating that specified commodi-
ties could not be exported unless CoCom granted an export license); see also Tarlowe, su-
pra note 29, at 964.
48. See Burkemper, supra note 23, at 159-60 (discussing member state's unilateral
veto power and recommending its elimination).
49. See Peter Swan, A Road Map to Understanding Export Controls: National Secu-
rity in a Changing Global Environment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 607, 620 (1993) (examining the
United States's aggressive policy). The United States's policy of listing commodities was
contrary to its historical free trade philosophy. See id. at 607, 619-20. The policy shift is
attributed to the rise of communism in the aftermath of World War II and subsequent
Presidential and Congressional efforts to confront this new national security threat. See
Trevor Hiestand, Recent Development, Swords into Plowshares: Considerations for 21st
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United States for curtailing international trade. ° These policies sacri-
ficed economic competitiveness for political and security interests. 1
United States politicians and CoCom members criticized the U.S. poli-
cies that influenced Congress to relax export controls. 2 The passage of
the Export Administration Act of 1969 (1969 Act)53 evidenced these po-
litical pressures. 4
B. The Beginnings of Modern Export Control Laws
The 1969 Act reflects Congress's realization that over-aggressive ex-
port control policies impact the economy adversely.55 Thus, the 1969 Act
limited restraints on exports to only those commodities essential to U.S.• 56
security. Rather than impose an absolute ban on exports to U.S. adver-
saries, Congress permitted the exportation of commodities with no po-
tential military use.57
The 1969 Act authorized the President to restrict exports of dual-use
Century Export Controls in the United States, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 679, 684-85 (1995)
(enunciating that Congress adopted a narrow and cynical view of foreign policy goals,
leading to strict controls on exports to communist countries).
50. See Swan, supra note 49, at 619-620 (discussing the tension among CoCom mem-
bers over the United States's efforts to list dual-use commodities on the Industrial List);
see also Oettinger, supra note 40, at 567 (highlighting the controversy over the Industrial
List among CoCom members). Representative Thomas L. Ashley noted in 1969 that the
United States's efforts to restrict exports to communist nations risked the United States's
relations with its allies. See H.R. REP. No. 524 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2705, 2709 (emphasizing that the United States's stringent measures risked American po-
litical goodwill with its allies).
51. See Hiestand, supra note 49, at 684-85.
52. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 524, at 2707-10 (criticizing the United States's export
control laws as too restrictive and impeding international trade).
53. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413) (expired 1979). The 1969 Act established
the current statutory regime for export controls in the United States. See Howard N. Fen-
ton III, Reforming the Procedures of the Export Administration Act: A Call for Openness
and Administrative Due Process, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 5-6 (1992).
54. See generally H.R. REP. No. 524, at 2709-10 (emphasizing the need to amend U.S.
export control laws in order to expand international trade).
55. Export Administration Act of 1969 § 2(3) (codified today at 50 U.S.C. § 2401(2),
(4)) (recognizing that the restriction of exports from the United States may adversely af-
fect the economy's welfare); see also Tarlowe, supra note 29, at 965 (stating that "the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1969 recognized that overbroad export controls impair the in-
terests of U.S. business to export their goods").
56. Export Administration Act of 1969 § 3(1)(B) (codified today at 50 U.S.C. §
2402(2)(A)) (establishing a policy to restrict exports only if the goods or technology con-
tribute to the military capabilities of another country or prove detrimental to U.S. national
security interests).
57. See KUTTEN & MURPHY, supra note 34, at § 1.03 (explaining the liberalization of
U.S. policies with respect to exports to communist bloc countries).
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commodities only after the President considered several factors. 8 These
factors included the status of the relationship between a foreign country
and the United States and its allies, 9 foreign availability of the commod-
ityP" and the potential for the United States to enter into foreign negotia-
tions to cease the exportation of the commodity.6
As a supplement to the 1969 Act, Congress passed the Equal Export
Opportunity Act (EEOA) in 1972.62 The EEOA permitted the exporta-
58. See Swan, supra note 49, at 618 (discussing the factors to be reviewed prior to re-
stricting exports to a specified destination).
59. See Export Administration Act of 1969 § 3(1) (codified today at 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404(b)(1) (1994)) (providing a list of factors the President should take in account to de-
termine whether to institute trade controls against a country).
60. See id. § 3(3) (codified today at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)). A foreign availability
analysis is not necessary to eliminate or relax export restraints. See CHANGES IN
CONTROLS, supra note 41. A foreign availability analysis is only required when the com-
modity is subject first to export control. See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-72, § 5(f), 93 Stat. 503, 506-13 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404(f)(1). The Secretary of Commerce conducts the foreign availability analysis in con-
sultation with the Secretary of Defense and other government agencies, to determine
whether goods or technology are available to controlled countries from non-U.S. suppliers
in sufficient quantity and of comparable quality so that the requirement of a validated li-
cense is ineffective in achieving U.S. national security objectives. See id.; see also Export
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 768.1 (defining comparable quality goods as
those that have the following similar characteristics: "(1) function; (2) technological ap-
proach; (3) performance thresholds, (4) maintainability and service life; and (5) any other
attribute relevant to the purpose for which the control was placed on the item"). If the
Secretary of Commerce determines that goods and technology are available to controlled
countries, the Secretary cannot require a validated license, unless the finds that the ab-
sence of controls on such goods are detrimental to U.S. national security interests. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(4)(1).
61. See Export Administration Act of 1969 § 3(3) (codified today at 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404(i), (k)) (directing the President and Secretary of State respectively to enter negotia-
tions with foreign countries to restrict exports to controlled countries in order to carry out
U.S. policy objectives).
62. Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401). Congress enacted the Equal Export Opportunity Act in re-
sponse to concerns that U.S. export control laws hindered U.S. companies from competing
with foreign producers. See S. REP. No. 92-890 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3085, 3086 (stating that the "United States is handicapping itself by continuing to control
the export of many items which are not of strategic value and are not controlled by our by
foreign competitors"). The EEOA's purpose was quick removal of unilateral export con-
trols that provided no protection to U.S. national security interests. See id. at 3085. The
EEOA proposed to utilize the commercial and technical expertise of private industry to
administer export control laws and regulations. See id. at 3086. Several industry witnesses
testified during committee hearings that U.S. licensing procedures took longer and were
more extensive than those required abroad. See id. at 3087-88 (noting industry's criticisms
of licensing delays, excessive documentation, limited predictability of license approval,
minimal license exceptions, and reporting requirements relating to diversions of technol-
ogy to unauthorized end-users). But see S. REP. No. 92-890,. at 3088 (stating that the con-
gressional committee refused to take a position on the industry's allegations). Although
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tion of commodities freely available from Western European or Japa-
nese competitors." The EEOA relaxed restrictions on exports in order
to prevent U.S. industries from losing business to its competitors.6
1. Modern Export Control Laws: The 1979 Act and Amendments
Faced with the expiration of the 1969 Act, Congress promulgated an
entirely new act known as the Export Administration Act of 1979 (1979
Act).65  The 1979 Act is the foundation of current export controls on
dual-use commodities. 66 It establishes a control system to manage the
risks of exporting military-sensitive technology to U.S. adversaries. 7
The 1979 Act maintains three policy objectives articulated by the Ex-
port Control Act of 1949: (1) to protect national security,6 (2) to pro-
mote the United States's foreign policy agenda,69 and (3) to prevent the
short supply of critical goods.70 In order to implement these objectives,
Congress delegated to the President broad authority to curtail the expor-
Congress refused to take a position regarding the on the allegations, it urged the Secretary
of Commerce to scrutinize the licensing procedures and requirements. See id. In addition,
Congress established an "industry-government technical advisory committee" to assist the
administration of export control laws. See id. (stating that the technical advisory commit-
tee helped define items on the export control list, provide industry with the latest export
control law developments, and advise government officials on military-sensitive technol-
ogy).
63. See KUTrEN & MURPHY, supra note 34, at § 1.03 (explaining Congress's realiza-
tion that export controls did not effectively control goods that non-CoCom members pro-
duced and made available); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(1) (describing the current
foreign availability provisions of the 1979 Act).
64. See S. REP. No. 92-890, at 3086-87 (discussing the negative implications of overly
restrictive export controls and the willingness to relax such controls to place U.S. produc-
ers "on an equal footing with foreign competitors").
65. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420.
66. See Tarlowe, supra note 29, at 966 (stating that 1979 Act replaced the 1969 Act as
the "primary export control legislation").
67. See CHANGES IN CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 1 (characterizing the current ex-
port control system as a risk management system).
68. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (authorizing export controls that are "necessary...
to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution
to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States"); see also id. § 2404 (de-
lineating the statutory provisions for national security controls).
69. Id. § 2402(2)(B) (providing that export controls may be used "to restrict the ex-
port of goods and technology where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of
the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations"); see also id. § 2405
(delineating the statutory provisions for foreign policy controls).
70. Id. § 2402(2)(C) (noting that export controls may be used "to restrict the export
of goods where necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of
scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand"); see
also id. § 2406 (delineating the statutory provisions for short supply controls).
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tation of goods and high-technology equipment." The President, how-
ever, rarely exercises the authority to restrict exports.72 Instead, the
Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration implements
these policy objectives through the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR),73 an extensive and complex licensing system for exports.74
The Commerce Control List (CCL) is the central component of the
EAR.75  The CCL is a comprehensive list "of all of the commodities,
software and technical data that are subject to export controls., 76 The
CCL delineates dual-use commodities subject to control,77 the reason for
control,78 and the countries in which the exportation of the commodity is
prohibited or limited. 79  The greatest share of goods regulated by the
EAR comprise of manufactured goods, including computers, telecom-
munications equipment, and related technology."
71. See id. § 2404 (a)(1) (stating that "the President may, in accordance with the pro-
visions of this section, prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States").
72. See Oettinger, supra note 40, at 569 (pointing out that the President rarely exer-
cises this authority because the President historically has delegated this authority to the
Secretary of Commerce).
73. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pt. 730 (1999).
74. Id. § 730.2 (providing that the EAR is designed primarily to implement the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979). The EAR provides detailed instructions for exporters
to determine their regulatory obligations. See 15 C.F.R. § 732 (providing over ten pages of
instructions and flow charts to assist exporters in deciphering the 550 pages of regulations
and supplementary information under the EAR).
75. The Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (1999) (providing an extensive list
of commodities subject to export control); see also Swan, supra note 49, at 625 (stating
"[t]he heart of the control scheme is the Commodity Control List").
76. McKenzie, supra note 39, at 3.
77. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 774, Supp. 1 (1999) (separating the dual-use commodities into
ten separate categories, including, (1) nuclear materials, facilities and equipment, and mis-
cellaneous, (2) materials processing, (3) materials, chemicals, microorganisms, and toxins,
(4) electronics, (5) computers, (6) telecommunications and information security, (7) lasers
and sensors, (8) navigation and avionics, (9) marine, and (10) propulsion systems, space
vehicles, and related equipment).
78. See id. § 738.2 (providing the following possible reasons for control: (1) anti-
terrorism, (2) chemical & biological weapons, (3) crime control, (4) encryption items, (5)
missile technology, (6) national security, (7) nuclear nonproliferation, (8) regional stability
(9) short supply, (10) computers, and (11) other significant items). Most dual-use com-
modities are subject to control for national security or foreign policy reasons rather than
for short supply reasons. See Steinbrecher, supra note 36, at 682 (noting that most manu-
factured goods, including computers, are controlled more likely for foreign policy and na-
tional security rather than short supply reasons).
79. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 738, Supp. 1 (providing a comprehensive list of countries subject
to control and the reasons for controls).
80. See Excerpts from Clinton Administration's Report, "Toward a National Export
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According to the 1979 Act, a U.S. producer who wishes to export a
listed item must first obtain a license from the Department of Com-
merce."' There are currently three types of licenses:" (1) validated li-
censes,83 (2) validated licenses authorizing multiple exports," and (3)
general licenses.85
Through the mid-1980s, export control laws placed restrictions on the
exportation of nearly all computer systems to communist bloc countries."
The Department of Commerce required exporters to obtain explicit ap-
proval prior to exporting computer systems to controlled countriesY
U.S. producers subsequently complained of lost business opportunities to
foreign competitors due to the length and extensive reporting require-
ments of the licensing process.88
Strategy": Executive Summary, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 38, at 1654 (Sept. 29, 1993),
[hereinafter Excerpts] (summarizing the 65 recommendations contained in the NES report
and noting that in 1993, 80% of export control licenses were sought for computers, tele-
communications equipment, and electronics equipment).
81. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(1)-(3) (1994) (de-
scribing the types of licenses that the Secretary of Commerce may issue under the Act).
82. See Export Licensing for Dual- Use Technology: Hearing Before Senate Subcomm.
on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong.
(1999) (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/press/99/MajakDualUseTech.
html> (statement of Roger Majak, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, De-
partment of Commerce) [hereinafter Majak Testimony] (noting that the Department of
Commerce processes annually approximately ten to twelve thousand dual-use license ap-
plications).
83. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(1) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to issue a
validated license). A validated license authorizes a specific export for which an exporter
applied. See id.
84. See id. § 2403(a)(2) (providing for validated licenses that authorize multiple ex-
ports, including a distribution license and a comprehensive operations license). The Ex-
portation Administration Amendments Act of 1985 added the validated license that
authorized multiple exports in order to streamline the licensing process for applicants
wishing to export multiple goods. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub.
L. 99-64, § 104(a), 99 Stat. 120, 122-23 (1985).
85. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(3) (authorizing the issuance of a general license). A
general license authorizes an applicant to export commodities without submitting an ap-
plication to the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration. See id.
86. See, e.g., id. § 2401(11) (recognizing that the acquisition of national security sensi-
tive goods by the Soviet Union and other countries poses a threat to the United States);
see also GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1.
87. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1.
88. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-890 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3085, 3086-88
(discussing the complaints over U.S. export controls and the licensing process); see also
Hiestand, supra note 49, at 693 (discussing the economic impact of U.S. licensing require-
ments on producers).
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2. The 1980s: Correcting the Deficiencies in the 1979 Act and Engaging
Japan to Control Supercomputers
In the 1980s, the Executive Branch and Congress fine-tuned the 1979
89Act through subsequent legislation. In addition, the United States and
Japan signed an agreement known as the Supercomputer Control Re-




a. Legislative Attempts to Balance Export Controls
The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 (1985 Act)9' and
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA)9' ad-
dressed several deficiencies contained in the 1979 Act.93 The 1985 Act
addressed the unnecessary regulation of dual-use exports to Western
European countries,94 foreign availability exceptions,"95 and the establish-
ment of objective criteria to determine whether a country should be
"controlled." '
89. See infra, notes 91-92 and accompanying text (providing the legislation enacted to
correct the deficiencies of the 1979 Act).
90. See infra, notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and func-
tion of the Supercomputer Control Regime).
91. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120
(1985) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
92. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)); see also Hiestand,
supra note 49, at 696-99 (discussing how the 1985 Act and the OTCA addressed the short-
comings of the 1979 Act).
93. See infra notes 94-99, 103-108 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of
the 1985 Act and the OTCA).
94. See Heistand, supra note 49, at 696. The 1985 Act eliminated these controls with
regard to friendly countries. See id. (stating that Congress enacted the 1985 Act to rectify
the inefficient licensing system for exports to "these friendly countries").
95. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(1)-(10) (1994)
(providing the definition of foreign availability and delineating the process for determin-
ing the availability of a commodity). The 1985 Act placed greater emphasis on placing ex-
port controls on only those commodities that the Department of Commerce controlled.
See Hiestand, supra note 49, at 696 (explaining that controls on U.S. commodities had lit-
tle effect in securing national security interests when foreign suppliers made such com-
modities available to controlled countries). The 1985 Act required the Secretary of Com-
merce to eliminate licensing requirements for commodities available from international
sources other than the United States. See id. (stating that the 1985 amendments required
the Secretary of Commerce to suspend licensing requirements for the controlled com-
modity).
96. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(1) (requiring the President to consider six factors to de-
termine whether to add a country to the control list). "Essentially, these criteria required
the President to demonstrate that the acquisition by the controlled country of regulated
technologies would be directly, not merely incidentally, 'detrimental' to national security."
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In addition, the 1985 Act made a distinction between two types of
computers: low-end systems, such as personal computers (PCs), and
high-end systems.97 Technological advancements in the computer indus-
try increased the composite theoretical performance level of low-end sys-
tems.98 The technological advancements sparked a surge in consumer
demand; in turn, the advancements resulted in the global proliferation of
low-end computer systems.99
The proliferation of low-end computer systems aggravated U.S. export
controls on computers because U.S. adversaries could readily obtain
computer technology from non-U.S. suppliers.1°° This reality led the De-
partment of Commerce to decontrol0° the first wave of PCs in January,
1985.' °
The OTCA aided the Department of Commerce's efforts to decontrol
PCs1°3 by establishing a supercomputer °4 definition that distinguished
Hiestand, supra note 49, at 696.
97. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1-2 (explaining that the PC industry's
success required the Department of Commerce to distinguish between high-end and low-
end systems because the Department of Commerce could no longer control the prolifera-
tion of all PC technology).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1.
100. See id. at 2 (discussing the impact of global computer manufacturing on the effec-
tiveness of U.S. export control laws).
101. See Foreign Availability Determinations Procedures and Criteria, 15 C.F.R. §
768.1 (1999) (defining decontrol as the removal of license requirements under the Export
Administration Regulations).
102. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that, because the Depart-
ment of Commerce could no longer effectively control the proliferation of PC technology,
U.S. producers could freely, and without a license, export the first wave of PCs).
103. See Hiestand, supra note 49, at 698 (noting that the OTCA broadened the num-
ber of countries that would be exempt from the EAR's validated licensing requirements).
Also, the OTCA addressed issues involving export controls, including relaxing the re-
quirement for obtaining an export control license for a shipment to CoCom countries and
others, clarifying the timelines and procedures for determining foreign availability, reduc-
ing the number of commodities on the CCL, and establishing limitations on the exporta-
tion of component parts of final products. See generally Swan, supra note 49, at 624-25.
104. See Definition of Supercomputer, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,932, 48,932 (1988) (referring to
a supercomputer as "advanced architecture, very high speed, computer systems that can
solve highly complex problems in strategically relevant time frames"). The high process-
ing capabilities of supercomputers have unique military applications. See id. The United
States and its Western European allies had a strategic military advantage over the Soviet
Union and its allies because the United States and Western European countries domi-
nated supercomputer technology. See id. The regulatory amendments sought to prevent
the erosion of this strategic advantage by subjecting supercomputer exports to the De-
partment of Commerce's review and approval. See id. (stating that the diversion of
supercomputer technology to the Soviet Union could jeopardize U.S. national security).
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low-end from high-end systems.' 5 The original definition in the OTCA
"established a threshold performance level above which a computer
would be considered a supercomputer for export control purposes."'
0 6
Congress set the initial supercomputer definition at 160 million floating
point operations per second (MFLOPS).'Y This definition was subject to
annual review.'O'
b. The Two Giant Supercomputer-Producing Countries Reach an
Agreement: The Supercomputer Control Regime
Beyond legislative efforts to improve export controls, the United
States and Japan reached an agreement in 1984 to coordinate export con-
trols for a specific list of the ten highest performing computers.'09 The
accord is known as the Supercomputer Control Regime."' Japanese and
U.S. government officials worked informally with computer producers to
impose a supercomputer definition and measures to safeguard national
security interests."' This bilateral agreement was generally successful in
establishing uniform export controls and preventing the proliferation of
high performance computers to countries of national security concern."'
U.S. producers criticized the agreement, however, because it resulted in
increased export controls on computers and allegedly failed to hold
Japanese producers to similar controls imposed in the United States."3
105. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2414,
102 Stat. 1107, 1347-48 (1988) (mandating the inclusion of a supercomputer definition in
the EAR).
106. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 2.
107. See id. at 2 & n.7 (defining MFLOPS as the rate of speed that a computer can per-
form complex scientific calculations based upon floating-point arithmetic). In June, 1990,
CoCom adopted a new standard for evaluating computer performance. See id. at 3 & n.13.
The new standard is called Composite Theoretical Performance (CTP) and is measured in
millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS). See id. at 3. MTOPS, like
MFLOPS, "indicate n greater raw performance of a computer to solve scientific computa-
tions quickly, but not the actual performance of a given machine for a given application."
GAO, EXPORT CONTROLS: INFORMATION ON THE DECISION TO REVISE HIGH
PERFORMANCE COMPUTER CONTROLS 2 n.4 (1998) [hereinafter THE DECISION].
108. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 2 (stating that the government reviewed
the level of MFLOPS on an annual basis).
109. See id. at 2 (discussing the creation of the Supercomputer Control Regime).
110. See GAO, EXPORT CONTROLS: NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND FOREIGN
AVAILABILITY FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORTS 5 (1998) [hereinafter
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES] (noting the existence of the Supercomputer Control Re-
gime).
111. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that the U.S. computer in-
dustry criticized the informality of the accord).
112. See id.
113. See id.
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C. A Change in Times: The End of the Cold War Sparks New Export
Control Laws
Although the 1985 and 1988 Acts liberalized U.S. export controls on
high technology goods, the United States maintained the most extensive
and stringent export control regime in comparison to its trading part-
ners. 11 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in
Eastern Europe, however, business interests lobbied Congress and the
Department of Commerce to relax export controls further.
1 5
In 1990, in response to the changing political and economic environ-
ment, CoCom took the first step toward changing export policies.
1 6
Member nations sought to reduce the number of goods subject to export
restraints.11 7 In June 1990, CoCom members reached an agreement to
relax controls on telecommunications, computers, and machine tools that
were exported to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries."'
In addition, CoCom agreed to revamp completely the Industrial List. t 9
In May 1991, CoCom members agreed upon a "'Core List' of commodi-
ties, software and technical data that [remained] subject to export con-
trols." 12 The Department of Commerce amended the EAR in August
1991 to incorporate the Core List. 2 ' These changes benefited exporters
by removing national security controls on commodities that previously
required a validated license before exporting the commodity.22
114. See Hiestand, supra note 49, at 699 (highlighting that the United States imposed
more restrictions despite export control liberalization in the 1980s).
115. See Tarlowe, supra note 29, at 960-61 (noting that the computer industry criticized
controls on dual-exports following the fall of the Soviet Union).
116. See McKenzie, supra note 39, at 2 (explaining that the fall of communism in East-
ern Europe, the break up of the Warsaw Pact, and the deterioration of the Soviet military
caused CoCom to reexamine its export control policies).
117. See id.
118. See id. (noting that the United States adopted the relaxed export controls in
1990).
119. See id. (commenting that the negotiations sought to limit export controls to goods
capable of benefiting the production of military applications).
120. Id. The Core List is divided into ten categories, as follows: (1) Materials, (2) Ma-
terials Processing, (3) Electronics, (4) Computers, (5) Telecommunications and Cryptog-
raphy, (6) Sensors, (7) Avionics and Navigation, (8) Marine Technology, (9) Propulsion
Systems and Transportation Equipment, and (10) Miscellaneous Items. See id. at 4.
121. See Revision of Commodity Control List, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,824 (1991) (amending
the EAR to comply with changes CoCom made).
122. See id. at 42,824.
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D. High Performance Computer Export Reforms Under the Clinton
Administration
1. The National Export Strategy and 1993 Amendments
On the heels of CoCom's recognition that technological advancements
necessitated a dynamic export control system, the Clinton Administra-
tion revised export control laws to reflect the realities of technological
innovations and a changed political environment.'3 In September 1993,
the Clinton Administration and members of the Trade Promotion Coor-
dinating Committee (TPCC)'24 unveiled the "National Export Strategy"
(NES).1' This report outlined a long-term strategic policy to increase
U.S. exports abroad through the implementation of over sixty recom-
mendations.
The TPCC recognized the excessiveness of computer and telecommu-
nication export controls.'27 The high technology industry claimed that
export controls cost the industry millions of dollars in potential reve-
nue."" Consequently, the TPCC advocated relaxing computer and tele-
communication equipment export controls and increasing computer
123. See President's Remarks Announcing a National Export Strategy and an Ex-
change with Reporters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1918, 1919 (Sept. 29, 1993) (stat-
ing that export control laws "no longer reflect the realities of the economic marketplace,"
political environment, or recent technological innovations).
124. See Export Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-429, § 2312, 106 Stat. 2186
(1992) (1992 Act) (establishing the TPCC).
125. TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
TOWARD A NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS i (1993); Morillo, supra note 14, at 1113. The NES is an outgrowth of the 1992
Act, which established TPCC, a group of nineteen government agencies involved in export
regulation. See Export Enhancement Act of 1992 §§ 2312(a), (d) (establishing, and pro-
viding the members of the TPCC). The 1992 Act charged the TPPC with developing a
singular framework to coordinate export promotion and financing, and to establish a stra-
tegic plan to carry out federal export promotion and financing programs. See id. §
2312(b)(1)-(2); see also S. REP. NO. 102-320, at 14 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1548, 1564 (commenting on the necessity of a singular national export strategy given the
disjointed approach to promoting exports by federal agencies).
126. See Excerpts, supra note 80, at 1659.
127. In 1993 over eighty percent of export control licenses were sought for computers,
telecommunications equipment, and electronics equipment. See TPCC Export Plan, supra
note 80, at 1645; see also Kenneth Flamm, Controlling the Uncontrollable, BROOKINGS
REV., Winter 1996, at 22 (pointing out that PCs fell under the definition of a
supercomputer because export laws failed to keep pace with technological innovations).
128. See, e.g., Eagleburger Says Allied Pressure Will Force End to CoCom Relatively
Soon, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 38, at 1609-10 (Sept. 29, 1993) (quoting Robert E.
Allen, Chairman, AT&T, as stating that then-current restrictions on high technology ex-
ports, if continued, could threaten approximately $500 million in potential sales to foreign
markets over five years).
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theoretical performance levels.29 The implementation of the TPCC's
recommendations removed licensing requirements on over $30 billion
worth of computers and high technology equipment.'30 The removal of
licensing requirements also meant that U.S. industries could export to
previously restricted foreign markets."'
The NES report recommended increasing the general license eligibility
level for digital computers from 12.5 MTOPS to 500 MTOPS for most
countries.'32 By February 1994, the Administration amended the-EAR to
implement this recommendation.133 The amendments also extended the
availability of general licenses for computers with a CTP level of 1000
MTOPS or less to exports sent to most Western European countries.'
14
In practice, this meant that exporters would not experience the delays
and reporting requirements characteristic of applying for a validated li-
cense."3 The exportation of computers with more than 1000 MTOPS,
however, required a validated license.36
In addition, the NES recommended a change in the definition of a
supercomputer by increasing the CTP level from 195 MTOPS to 2000
MTOPS.'37 Upon the unanimous recommendation of the Departments
129. See Excerpts, supra note 80, at 1652 (listing recommendations fifty-two through
fifty-four of the NES report, which advocated increasing MTOP levels for both
supercomputers and low end computers).
130. See id. at 1648.
131. See Morillo, supra note 14, at 1120 (explaining that the computer and telecom-
munication industries were pleased by the NES recommendations because of the potential
for increased profits in markets previously restricted by export control laws); see also
Steinbrecher, supra note 38, at 691 (affirming that the export plan permitted U.S. produc-
ers to export supercomputers to previously restricted countries).
132. See Excerpts, supra note 80, at 1645.
133. See Computers: General License Eligibility; Supercomputer Definition, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8848, 8848 (1994) (original amendments codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 770, 772, 773, 776,
and 799) (increasing the general license availability to cover computers with a CTP of 500
MTOPS or less for countries on the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Special Country List").
The regulatory amendments did not permit a general license for exports to Iran, Syria, the
People's Republic of China, or the South African military or police. See id.
134. See id. (explaining the eligibility requirements for exporting computers with a
CTP level greater than 1000 MTOPS).
135. Cf. S. REP. No. 92-890 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3085, 3086-087
(discussing the industry's criticism of licensing delays and reporting requirements).
136. See Computers: General License Eligibility; Supercomputer Definition, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 8848.
137. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 3-4 (explaining that the NES report rec-
ommended that the United States begin negotiations with Japan to increase the CTP lev-
els); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998-H.R. 1119 and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Nat'l
Sec., 105th Cong. 908 (1997) (statement of William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary for Ex-
port Administration, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Reinsch Testimony] (stating
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of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy, and the Arms Control Dis-
armament Agency, in 1994 the Bureau of Export Administration altered
the definition of a supercomputer in the EAR by increasing the CTP
level to 1500 MTOPS.13s
2. Applying the National Export Strategy Internationally: Dissolution
of CoCom and the Creation of Wassenaar
To supplement the liberalization of national export control laws, in.
November 1993 the Clinton Administration proposed to dissolve CoCom
and create a successor multilateral export control regime more oriented
with the post Cold-War environment. 139 After March 31, 1994, CoCom
ceased to exist.
Two years later, twenty-eight countries reached an agreement to cre-
ate the "Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies" (Wassenaar Arrange-
ment or Wassenaar). 42 Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, member
that the definition of a supercomputer was outdated given that "high-end Pentium-based
personal computers sold... at retail outlets perform[ed] at about 200 to 250 MTOPS").
138. See Computers: General License Eligibility; Supercomputer Definition, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 8848 (explaining the new definition of a supercomputer and the changes to licens-
ing requirements); see also Flamm, supra note 127, at 24 (noting that the United States was
unsuccessful in persuading Japan, the only other country manufacturing high performance
computers at that time, to increase the threshold performance level to 2000 MTOPS).
139. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 13-15 (discussing the formation of Was-
senaar); see also infra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing former Secretary of De-
fense William Perry's role in dissolving CoCom). The objectives of the new multilateral
organization included:
[1.] Preventing states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya from obtaining
conventional weapons and other sensitive technologies[;]
[2.] Furthering the process of engaging Russia and other Newly Independent
States in developing export control systems[;] [and]
[3.] Removing disadvantages to U.S. exporters resulting from inadequate multi-
lateral coordination on exports of sensitive technologies to terrorist states.
Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 14 (footnote omitted).
140. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 14. CoCom members agreed to utilize the
CoCom export control lists until a successor organization was formed. See id
141. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Was-
senaar Members and Criteria (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Wassenaar/
Members&Criteria.htm> [hereinafter Wassenaar Members]. Current Wassenaar member-
ship consists of the following thirty-three countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Republic of Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States.
See id.
142. See OSCE, Wassenaar Arrangement Office, Brief History of the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.osce.usia.co.at/wassenaar/wahist.htm>
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countries are no longer required to submit export licenses for military
sensitive commodities and technologies for review by other countries.
4
1
In lieu of this review, member countries exercise independent discretion
to determine whether to export the commodity or technology at issue.'4
Critics argue that the discretionary implementation of Wassenaar poli-
cies removes the "teeth" that CoCom exemplified in controlling dual-use
exports. 145
3. Trying to Keep up With Technology and Changing National Security
Threats: The 1996 Amendments
In 1995, the Clinton Administration struggled to keep pace with the
relentless technological revolution.'46 Based on a 1995 Stanford Institute
report,47 the Clinton Administration announced major reforms to export
controls on high performance computers on October 6, 1995.' 4' The re-
(providing a brief history of the creation of Wassenaar). Twenty-eight countries formally
agreed to establish Wassenaar in December 1995. See id. The agreement did not become
effective until thirty-three co-founding members approved the initial elements of the Was-
senaar Arrangement. See id. Wassenaar's purpose is "to promote international and re-
gional peace and security by promoting transparency, and responsibility and, when appro-
priate, restraint in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use good[s] and technologies."
Id.
143. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 15 (explaining the differences between Co-
Coin's and Wassenaar's export license review process).
144. See id. (stating that member countries share a common control list, but decide
independently how to implement the control list and its objectives).
145. Peter H. Stone, High-Tech's High Anxiety, 30 NAT'L J. 2926, 2931 (1998). One
Pentagon critic claims that Wassenaar "doesn't control anything. It's basically a reporting
regime." Id.
146. See Flamm, supra note 127, at 22 (stating that the government could not effec-
tively control the export of computer technology due to advancements in the computer
industry); see also GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1 (recognizing that "[aldapting ex-
port control policy to accommodate rapid changes in the designs, development, distribu-
tion, and use of technology is necessarily an ongoing and difficult process"). The com-
puter industry's success in developing cutting edge technology is highlighted by the
advancements in microprocessor chips. See Flamm, supra note 127, at 23 (noting that
technological advancements increase the capacity of microprocessor chips every five
years).
147. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 4 (noting that the Stanford University
study influenced the executive branch to review high performance computer export con-
trols). But see Letter from David Tarbell, Director of Defense Technology Security Ad-
ministration, to Benjamin D. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office 44,
45 (July 16, 1998) [hereinafter Tarbell Letter], reprinted in THE DECISION, supra 108, at 44
(stating that the Stanford University study was just one of many inputs the Executive
Branch considered in assessing computer export controls).
148. See U.S. Announces Major Reform of Computer Export Controls, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1995, at 776 [hereinafter Major Reform] (announcing that
computer export control reforms will adjust to the spread of technology and preserve U.S.
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forms were two-fold. First, the Clinton Administration proposed to in-
crease CTP levels with respect to licensing requirements. Second,the
Clinton Administration planned to create a license exception for com-
puter exports based upon a four-tiered country-licensing system.' These
reforms sought to protect allied security interests and to eliminate un-
necessary or ineffective export controls. 52 In addition, a four-tiered li-
censing system permits the government to customize licensing require-
ments and control levels consistent with the national security and
proliferation risk posed at a specific destination.'
4. The Computer Tier Country System and Increased MTOP Levels
The Administration amended the EAR by establishing a four-tiered li-
censing system to distinguish between countries that posed varying de-
national security interests).
149. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 2 (noting that the
Clinton Administration reforms increased CTP levels by 1,500 MTOPS in 1996).
150. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pt. 772 (1999) (defining a li-
cense exception as an authorization "to export or reexport, under stated conditions, items
subject to the EAR that otherwise would require a license"). There is a license exception
for the export or reexport of digital computers. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.7(a). There are four
computer tiers. See id. § 740.7(b)-(d). Computers with a CI'P level greater than 2000
MTOPS are eligible for a license exception for Tier 1 countries. See id. § 740.7(b)(2).
Computers with a CTP level greater than 2000, but equal to or less than 10,000 MTOPS,
are eligible for a license exception for Tier 2 countries. See id. § 740.7(c)(2). Finally, com-
puters with a CTP level greater than 2000 level MTOPS, but less than or equal to 7000
MTOPS, are eligible for a license exception for Tier 3 countries. See id. § 740.7(d)(2). A
license exception for Tier 3 countries does not authorize exports or reexports to military
end-users or end-uses and nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile end-users and end-uses.
See id. § 740.7(d)(3); see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2, 744.3, 744.4 (defining nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missile end-users and end-uses). A license exception is not available for
Computer Tier 4 countries. See id.
151. See Major Reform, supra note 148, at 776.
152. See GAO, EXPORT CONTROLS: SALES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS
TO RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES 3 (1997) [hereinafter SALES TO
RUSSIA) (explaining that regulations became unnecessary and ineffective as a result of
computer technology advances); see also Letter from William M. Daley, Secretary of
Commerce, to Mr. Harold Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade
Issue, General Accounting Office (Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Daley Letter], reprinted in
THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 35 (stating that the 1995 decision to relax export con-
trols was prompted by rapid technological advances, extensive availability, limited con-
trollability, and insignificant national security application of computers below a certain
performance level). In sum, the reforms removed licensing requirements for desktop
computers, required exporters to keep accurate records of computers exported with a CTP
level over 2000 MTOPS, and required an export license for high performance computers
exported to Russia and other specified countries. See SALES TO RUSSIA, supra, at 3.
153. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 2 (summarizing the goal of
the Clinton Administration in announcing changes to high performance computer con-
trols).
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grees of risk to U.S. national security.1 14 Exporters were required to meet
different licensing requirements depending upon the country and its
status within one of four computer tiers."' Exports to Computer Tier 1
countries, for example, do not require a license issued by the Depart-
ment of Commerce before exporting high performance computers"' be-
cause these countries are U.S. allies and do not threaten U.S. national se-
curity interests.157 Computer Tier 2 countries consist of countries that
pose minimal national security threats to the United States.158 Exporters
are permitted to export high performance computers up to 10,000
MTOPS under a license exception, but a validated license is required
above that level. 59 Computer Tier 3 countries either pose nonprolifera-
tion or security concerns or are not signatories to the Nuclear NonProlif-
eration Treaty.' 6 Export licenses are required for computers over 7000
MTOPS for all end-users and end-uses, and over 2000 MTOPS for mili-
161tary or proliferation-related end-users and end-uses.
Computer Tier 4 countries are considered "embargoed" countries due
154. See Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: License Exceptions, 61
Fed. Reg. 64,272 (1996) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 750, 752,
758, and 770) (amending the EAR by reorganizing the license exceptions referenced by
the Commerce Control List). The Clinton Administration assigned countries to one of the
four Computer Tiers by assessing the countries on the basis of the following six criteria:
(1) [E]vidence of on-going programs of national security concern, including pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction with associated delivery systems and
regional stability and conventional threats; (2) membership in or adherence to
non-proliferation and export control regimes; (3) an effective export control sys-
tem, including enforcement and compliance programs and an associated assess-
ment of diversion risks; (4) overall relations with the United States; (5) whether
U.N. sanctions had been imposed; and (6) prior licensing history.
THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 7.
155. See Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: License Exceptions, 61
Fed. Reg. at 64,276-77 (providing the requirements of each of the four Computer Tiers).
156. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 2.
157. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 3 (listing computer Computer Tier 1 coun-
tries as primarily U.S. allies, including Western European countries and Japan).
158. See id.
159. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.7(c)(2) (1999) (permit-
ting U.S. producers to export computers to Computer Tier 3 countries under a license ex-
ception); see also id. § 740.7(a) (defining the scope of a license exception and discussing
the requirements for granting a license exception).
160. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 2 (distinguishing the charac-
teristics of each of the four tiers).
161. See id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 744 (defining end-users and end-uses). In order to
determine end-users and end-uses, exporters are required to conduct an end-use screening
process. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 3 n.6 (describing the end-use screening
process as a mechanism for exporters "to evaluate whether a transaction involves an unac-
ceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, a proliferator or military end user").
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to their support of international terrorism.16 2 Exporters are permitted to
export only computers at a mere 6 MTOP level.163 Thus, exportation of
computers to Tier 4 countries is virtually prohibited."'
In order to ward off criticism from national security advocates over the
liberalization of export controls, President Clinton issued an Executive
Order that permitted the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy,
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to review any export
license application submitted to the Department of Commerce pursuant
to the 1979 Act and the EAR.1 65 The Executive Order subjected export
controls to additional scrutiny by agencies more concerned with national
security.'
Industry leaders predicted that the 1995 reforms would free more than
$10 billion worth of computer exports from the need to obtain individual
licenses. 67 The regulations relieved U.S. computer manufacturers from
the burden of individual licensing requirements that often hindered U.S.
producers from competing with foreign producers.' 68 Due to these re-
forms, the number of issued export licenses decreased from 395 in 1995
to 42 in 1997.169
5. Two Steps Forward One Step Back: Congress Limits Presidential
Authority
The 1996 reforms came under attack in 1997 when International Busi-
ness Machines (IBM) and Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI) allegedly ex-
ported high performance computers to Russian nuclear weapons labora-
tories in violation of export control laws.' 70 According to then Russian
162. 15 C.F.R. § 740.7(e) (prohibiting the use of a license exception for exports to
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria); see id. § 742.1(d) (identifying
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as countries that support interna-
tional terrorism).
163. See generally Reinsch Testimony, supra note 137, at 911.
164. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 2.
165. See Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767-68 (1996).
166. Id.
167. See Department of Commerce: Commerce Department Implements Regulations
Liberalizing Controls on Computers (Jan. 25, 1996) (Press Release, on file with Catholic
University Law Review) (commenting on the Clinton Administration's announcement of
reforming export controls on higher performance computers and the impact on the com-
puter industry).
168. See id.
169. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 4.
170. See Sale or Transfer of Supercomputers to Russian Nuclear Weapon Laboratories:
Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998-H.R. 1119 and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the House Subcomm. on Military
Procurement of the Comm. on Nat'l Sec., 105th Cong. 901, 905 & n.5 (1997) (statement of
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Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, the computers were nec-
essary for nuclear stockpile maintenance.71 Subsequent media reports
indicated, however, that Russia planned to use the computers from Sili-
con Graphics to design nuclear warheads.'
These events heightened Congress's concerns that the Clinton Admini-
stration's policies contributed to the proliferation of military-sensitive
technology.7 To control computer exports to Computer Tier 3 coun-
tries, Congress limited the President's authority to change computer ex-
port control laws in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 (NDAA) 4
The NDAA requires the President to prohibit the export or reexport
of computers with a CTP level of more than 2000 MTOPS to a Tier 3
country if the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, or the
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency object to such
export or reexport. If one of the above agencies objects, however, the
Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National
Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office) [hereinafter
Hearings on Russian Computer Sales] (discussing the possible improper sale of high per-
formance computers to Russia); see also Daniel Sneider, Of Supercomputers and National
Security: Can U.S. Keep 'War Games' Computers from Russia?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1997, at 3 (discussing the investigation of SGI in light of the Clinton
Administration's decision to relax computer export controls). IBM pled guilty to 17
counts of violating export control laws and paid the maximum allowable fine of $8.5 mil-
lion. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 139 (discussing U.S. computer producers' viola-
tions of export control laws). At the time of this writing, the government investigation
against Silicon graphics is ongoing. See id. at 139-40.
171. See SALES TO RUSSIA, supra note 152, at 1 (stating that Russia needed the com-
puters to help maintain its nuclear stockpile, especially in light of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, which prohibited future nuclear explosions).
172. See Gary Milhollin, U.S. Must Curb Export of Supercomputers, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 1, 1997, at llB (inferring that the Clinton Administration's
computer export control policies resulted in the export of potentially dangerous nuclear
weapon technology).
173. See NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1998, H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
105-340, at 817 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N 2251, 2603 (expressing concern over
reports that countries considered proliferation risks obtained U.S.-produced
supercomputers for military purposes).
174. National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1211, 111 Stat.
1629, 1932 (1998); see also President's Statement on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1861 (Nov. 24,
1997). In signing this Act, President Clinton expressed disappointment that it limited his
ability to adapt computer export controls to changing national security needs and techno-
logical trends. See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Export Controls on Com-
puters (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/HPCs/WhiteHouse HPCFAct
sheet.html> (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter July Fact Sheet].
175. See National Defense Authorization Act § 1211(a) (providing the requirements
for such exports and reexports).
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Secretary of Commerce may still issue a license without regard to the li-
censing exceptions provided by § 740.7 of the EAR.'76
In addition, a Presidential decision to increase the CTP level for Tier 3
countries cannot take effect until 180 days after the President submits a
report to Congress setting forth the new CTP level and the justification
for the increased level.'77 The NDAA authorized the President to re-
move countries from the Computer Tier 3 country group.' 78 A decision
to do so, however, becomes effective only 120 days after the President
sends a report to Congress setting forth the justification for the dele-
tion.1
79
. Finally, the NDAA requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a
post-shipment verification of exports of high performance computers
with a CTP level of more than 2000 MTOPS to Tier 3 countries.'" The
post-shipment verification process identifies and prevents future diver-
sions of computer technology to unauthorized end-users and end-uses.'
6. The 1999-2000 Amendments: More Wins for the Computer Industry
The congressional response to the alleged unauthorized exports did
not dissuade the Clinton Administration from further liberalizing com-
176. See id. § 1201(c) (providing time limits for federal agencies to object to the export
or reexport of a computer and authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to issue a license
irrespective of objections). The export or reexport of the computer is authorized if no
specified agency objects. See id.
177. See id. § 1211(d). The report to Congress must: (1) address the extent to which
the computers with the adjusted CTP level are available from other countries, (2) address
the potential military uses of computers with the new CTP level, and (3) assess the na-
tional security implications of such uses. See id.
178. See id. § 1211(e)(1)-(2) (conditioning the President's authority to remove a coun-
try from Tier 3 on the submission of a report to Congress setting forth the justification for
the deletion). The President is not authorized to remove a country from the Tier 3 list if:
(A) the country is a "nuclear-weapon state" (as defined by Article IX of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the country is not a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or
(B) the country is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons and the country is listed on Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty.
Id. § 1211(e)(3)(A)-(B).
179. See id. § 1211(e)(2).
180. See id. § 1213(a). The Secretary of Commerce is also required to submit an an-
nual report to Congress with the results of the post-shipment verifications. See id. §
1213(c). The report must include "(1) the destination country[,] (2) the date of export[,]
(3) the intended end use and intended end user[,] and (4) the results of the post-shipment
verification." Id. § 1212(c)(1)-(4).
181. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 11 (discussing that the post-shipment veri-
fication process assures only that high performance computers are not physically diverted,
and provides no assurance that computers are being used for military purposes).
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puter export controls.' In response to a dramatic increase in microproc-
essing power, ' President Clinton announced initiatives on July 1, 1999
and February 1, 2000 to amend again U.S. export controls on high per-
formance computers. ' s4 The Administration incorporated its July 1 pro-
posal into EARs released on August 3, 199985 The EAR amendments,
and the proposed amendments announced in February 2000, maintain
the four computer tiers announced in 1995 but amend the countries in,
and control levels for, those tiers.' 6
The July 1999 amendments moved Hungary, Poland, the Czech Re-
public, and Brazil from Tier 2 to Tier 1.187 The Administration will con-
sider moving other countries into Tier 1 at a later date.""
For Computer Tier 2, the amendments raised the individual licensing
level from 10,000 MTOPS to 20,000 MTOPS.'8 9 The Clinton Administra-
tion's February 2000 initiative proposed to increase this level to 33,000
MTOPS immediately.' 90 In addition, the Clinton Administration pro-
182. See Revision of High Performance Computer Licensing Policy, 64 Fed. Reg.
42,009 (1999) (issuing the final rule to revise export control for high performance comput-
ers).
183. See Export Administration Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and
Fin. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), avail-
able in 1999 WL 27596345, at *5, *10 (statement of Dan Hoydysh, Unisys Corporation,
Co-Chairman of the Computer Coalition for Responsible Exports) [hereinafter Hoydysh
Testimony] (stating that the five-fold increase in the power of microprocessors placed
pressure on export control laws).
184. See July Fact Sheet, supra note 174 (announcing that the July 1st revisions to the
United States export control laws would promote national security, streamline the regula-
tory process, and increase the effectiveness of the export control system); Office of the
Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Export Controls on Computers (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
<http://www.bxa.doc.gov/HPCs/WhiteHouseFactSheetonHPCs.html> (Feb. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter February Fact Sheet]. President Clinton reasoned that the reforms were nec-
essary because of rapid increases in computer technology. See President's Statement on
Export Controls on High Performance Computers and Semiconductors, 35 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1247 (July 5, 1999) [hereinafter Clinton's Statement] (elaborating that
supercomputers once costing millions of dollars are available now in an inexpensive desk-
top computer with similar processing capabilities).
185. See Revision of High Performance Computer Licensing Policy, 64 Fed. Reg.
42,009 (1999) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 738, 740, and 742) (amending the EAR





189. See id. (explaining that the rapid evolution of computer technology required up-
ward revisions to the CTP levels).
190. See February Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.
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posed to move Romania from Computer Tier 3 to Computer Tier 2.
For Computer Tier 3, the amendments maintained the two-level li-
censing system for civilian and military proliferation end-users, and
raised individual licensing levels for both classes of end-users, from 2000
to 6500 MTOPS for military end-users and from 7000 to 12,500 MTOPS
for civilian end-users.' 92 The Clinton Administration announced in Feb-
ruary 2000 that it plans to increase individual licensing requirements for
military end-users from 6500 to 12,500 MTOPS for military end-users
and from 12,300 to 20,000 MTOPS for civilian end-users.' 93 The increase
for civilian end-users became effective immediately.'9 The license level
for military end-users, however, will become effective in August 2000.'9'
The July 1999 regulatory amendments increased the NDAA notifica-
tion level from 2000 MTOPS to 6500 MTOPS.'" The February 2000 ini-
tiative calls to increase the NDAA notification level to 12,500.197 The
NDAA permits Congress to review the decision to increase the threshold
performance level for a sixth month period, at which time the NDAA
notification level goes into effect. 98 Neither the July 1999 nor the Febru-
191. See id. (stressing that Romania's move to Computer Tier 2 will not become effec-
tive until Congress has had the opportunity to review the proposal for the NDAA-
required 120 day period).
192. See Revision of High Performance Computer Licensing Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. at
42,010 (providing amendments to the EAR for Computer Tier 3 countries). The Clinton
Administration maintained a lower threshold for military end-users than civilian end-users
because Computer Tier 3 countries pose the greatest risk to U.S. national security. See
Clinton's Statement, supra note 184, at 1247 (explaining the considerations the Administra-
tion undertook to determine the appropriate CTP levels for Computer Tier 3 countries).
Nevertheless, the Administration increased CTP levels from 2000 MTOPS to 6500
MTOPS for military end-users and end uses for Computer Tier 3 countries in light of this
security risk. See Revision of High Performance Computer Licensing Policy, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 42,010. The Administration explains in its regulatory amendments that "[t]his level re-
flects the Administration's determination that widespread commercial availability makes
computers with a performance of 6500 MTOPS or less uncontrollable." Id. The new level
of 6500 MTOPS for military end-users became effective on January 23, 2000. See Febru-
ary Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.
193. See February Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.
194. See id.
195. See id. (noting that the increase for military end-users will not become effective
for another six months because the NDAA permits Congress to review increases for a six-
month period).
196. See id. (reminding exporters that, until Congress reviews this change, they must
continue to give Congress advance notification of any exports or reexports of computers
with a CTP greater than 2000 MTOPS to Computer Tier 3 destinations).
197. See id. (discussing the proposal to increase the NDAA notification requirement).
198. See id. (summarizing the process of the President's decision to raise the NDAA
notification level and the process to effectuate that decision).
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ary 2000 initiatives announced changes for Tier 4 countries. 199
E. Congress Takes a Step Into the Ring: The Export Administration Act of
1999
On October 8, 1999, Senator Phil Gramm introduced legislation to
reauthorize and reform the 1979 Act.2°° In several ways the legislation
complements the Clinton Administration's latest EAR revisions and an-
nouncement to further revise export controls in February 2000.01 In par-
ticular, the legislation includes several provisions that will impact the
regulation of computer exports, including provisions to: (1) establish a
country tiering mechanism, 202 (2) strengthen the foreign availability ex-
emption23 and create a mass market status,20 (3) establish a National Se-
curity Control List,20 ' and (4) reduce the amount of time Congress may
review Presidential decisions to increase CTP levels for Computer Tier 3
199. See id. at 2-3; July Fact Sheet, supra note 174, at 3 (stating that there are no
planned changes to the Computer Tier 4 licensing group).
200. See Export Administration Act of 1999, S. 1712, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999); see also
S. REP. No. 106-180, at 1-2 (1999) (providing that the purpose of the legislation is to up-
date national security export controls to reflect the current world situation).
201. Cf. S. 1712, § 203 (proposing to reform U.S. export control laws to reflect tech-
nological, economic, and political changes).
202. See id. (proposing to establish a country tiering system for all commodities on the
Commerce Control List that resembles the Computer Tier System established in 1996).
203. See id. § 211 (amending the current foreign availability exemption by permitting
interested parties to petition the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a foreign availability
analysis).
204. See id. (establishing an exemption for a commodity with a mass-market status).
A commodity achieves mass market status if it: (1) is produced and is available for sale in
a large volume to multiple purchasers, (2) is widely distributed through commercial chan-
nels, (3) is conducive to shipment and delivery by normal commercial means, and (4) may
be used for its normal intended purpose without substantial modifications. See id. §
211(d)(2). The Secretary of Commerce cannot require an export license for a commodity
with a mass-market status. See id. § 211(c) (requiring the removal of the commodity from
the National Security Control List, and prohibiting the requirement of a license or other
authorization to export the commodity).
205. See id. § 202 (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to establish and maintain a
National Security Control List that balances the national security risks of not controlling
the commodity and the economic costs associated with its control). The National Security
Control List must be consistent with the proposed provisions relating to the purposes of
national security controls:
(1) To restrict the export of items that would contribute to the military potential
of countries so as to prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States or its allies.
(2) To stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the means to
deliver them, and other significant military capabilities[.]
(3) To deter acts of international terrorism.
Id. § 201(b).
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countries.2° The legislation also enhances enforcement of export control
violations2O
II. REIGNITING THE HISTORICAL DILEMMA: RECENT REFORMS FALL
SHORT OF STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS
With the most recent revisions-and proposed amendments to the EAR,
the Clinton Administration continued to liberalize export controls in the
wake of technological advancements and consistent lobbying0 by the
high technology industry.2 9 The Clinton Administration intends to relax
export controls further, although members of Congress indicated their
desire to tighten export controls in light of the recent computer espio-
nage involving the People's Republic of China. ° An analysis of the
Clinton Administration's justification for revising the EAR and the deci-
sionmaking process for increasing composite theoretical performance
levels demonstrates the difficulty in obtaining a balance between na-
tional security and economic interests.
A. The Clinton Administration's Formula
The Clinton Administration's latest reforms are yet another attempt to
strike a balance between competing economic and national security in-
206. See id. § 211(c)(2) (striking "180" and inserting "60" in the second line of Section
1211(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998). This provision
substantially reduces congressional review of the President's decision to change CTP lev-
els for Computer Tier 3 countries, although President Clinton wishes to reduce congres-
sional review to thirty days. See July Fact Sheet, supra note 174, at 3 (announcing that the
Administration intends to work with Congress to reduce congressional review to thirty
days to allow the Administration to respond to technological changes).
207. See Export Administration Act of 1999, S. 1712, 106th Cong. § 607 (1999) (pro-
viding increased penalties, a strengthened post verification process, and a "Patriot" provi-
sion that allows informants to report violations and receive awards in those cases that re-
sult in conviction).
208. See, e.g., David Phinney, Computers to China (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.
abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/chinaexport990317.html> (March 17, 1999) (re-
porting that the U.S. computer industry launched an all-out lobbying campaign to con-
vince Congress to relax export controls).
209. See White House Eases Exports on Computers; Old Regulations Didn't Keep Up,
CIN. ENQUIRER, July 2, 1999, at A8 (reporting that the Clinton Administration eased ex-
port controls because export control regulations did not keep pace with computer tech-
nology).
210. See generally, Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 172-73 (summarizing recommenda-
tions to strengthen export control laws). But see Bruce Stokes, Lethal Exports, 31 NAT'L
J. 1473, 1475 (1999) (noting that 79 members of Congress called on President Clinton to
increase the MTOPS threshold in May, 1999).
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terests.2" Under Secretary of Commerce, William A. Reinsch, explained
recently that the Clinton Administration's policy is based on the follow-
ing equation: "exports=healthy high-tech companies=strong defense." '
In other words, if the high technology industry is able to export its goods
to foreign markets, high technology industries will continue to prosper.2"
Moreover, if the high technology industry remains strong, it can continue
to aid U.S. military development2 14 and enhance U.S. national security. 5
B. Justifying the Relaxation of Export Controls and Solving the Equation
According to the Clinton Administration, the key to solving the "ex-
ports=healthy high-tech companies=strong defense" equation requires
relaxing burdensome licensing requirements and providing the President
the flexibility to change export control laws. 6
1. Burdensome Licensing Requirements Stifle Computer Industry
Competitiveness
A fundamental concern of the Clinton Administration is the excessive
nature of U.S. export controls on dual-use commodities.2 7 Historically,
211. See July Fact Sheet, supra note 174, at 1; see also February Fact Sheet, supra note
184, at 1 (announcing that the update export control laws would enhance U.S. national
security, improve the U.S. export control system, and eliminate unnecessary and burden-
some regulations on both government and industry).
212. Reinsch Speech, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that this policy seeks to prevent ex-
port controls from crippling the high-tech industry and in turn, setting back U.S. military
development).
213. See id. (noting that the high technology industry significantly relies on exports for
sales).
214. See id. The United States military has increasingly relied on Commercial Off the
Shelf items (COTS) due to budgetary constraints and the inability of the military indus-
trial base to keep pace with technological advancements. See id. The U.S. military estab-
lishment turned to the civilian sector to meet its needs. See id. High performance com-
puter technology is utilized, among other military applications, for "smart weapons,"
weapons design and test simulation, command, control and communications functions. Id.
Under Secretary Reinsch explained that because of this reality, it is imperative that the
high technology industries remain a vibrant sector of the U.S. economy in order to main-
tain military superiority. See id.
215. See White House to Loosen Curbs on PC Exports, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 2,
1999, at 6 (quoting President Clinton's remarks that "a strong, vibrant high-technology
industry is in America's national security interests"); see also Hoydysh Testimony, supra
note 182, at 1 (stating that U.S. national security is tied to U.S. technological leadership).
216. See generally Clinton's Statement, supra note 184 (advocating to work with Con-
gress to relax export controls and to reduce the time period before regulations can go into
effect to maintain the strength of the computer industry).
217. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the Clinton Administra-
tion's concern that U.S. industries could potentially lose four billion dollars in revenue due
to the excessive nature of U.S. export control laws).
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the U.S. high technology industry sacrificed its competitiveness to com-
ply with U.S. export control laws. 8 In 1993, for example, Robert E. Al-
len, Chairman of American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T), testi-
fied before Congress that export controls would cause AT&T to loose
approximately $500 million in sales over five years to competitors.219
Most recently, the President's Chief of Staff, John Podesta, stated that
without changes to export controls, the United States would lose four
220billion dollars in sales over the next four years.
The concern over export controls grew recently with the emergence of
new foreign competition. 21 The United States and Japan no longer have
222a monopoly over the production of high performance computers. Pro-
ducers from Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea accompany the United
States and Japan.23 To worsen matters for U.S. producers, many com-
petitors are not subject to the same stringent export control laws as those
218. See 145 CONG. REC. E827 (daily ed. May 3, 1999) (complaining that license re-
quirements to Tier 3 countries may take as long as 30 days, causing U.S. corporations to
cede sales to foreign competitors); see also Bob Deans, Clinton to Loosen Rules for Com-
puter Exports, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 2, 1999, at A12 (explaining that changes to
export control laws were necessary to prevent U.S. producers from losing out on a global
market of five million high performance computers per year); ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES
ALLIANCE, EIA Lays Out Guidelines for Information Age Export Controls (Press Re-
lease, March 3, 1999) (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.eia.org/PAD/PRESS/FILES/99-
14.html> (stating that the "U.S. high-technology companies cannot compete effectively
with the global marketplace because of outdated, burdensome, and unilateral export con-
trols").
219. See Export Controls on Advanced Telecommunications: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Econ. Policy, Trade and Env't of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd
Cong. 46, 48 (1993) (statement of Robert E. Allen, Chairman of AT&T) (discussing the
potential impact of U.S. export control laws on AT&T sales).
220. See Press Briefing by Chief of Staff John Podesta, Commerce Secretary William
Daley, and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre (visited Feb. 19, 2000)
<http://www.bxa.doc.gov/HPCs/WHBriefing7-1-99.htmi> (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter
Press Briefing] (warning that such losses could weaken the computer industry and the
economy without benefiting U.S. national security).
221. See generally id. at 1-2.
222. See Maibach Testimony, supra note 10, at 4. Mr. Maibach summarized the com-
petition as:
[Fourteen] of the top 25 manufacturers of workstations are foreign; 10 of the top
25 manufactures of mid-range, mainframe and upper range servers are foreign;
15 of the top 25 manufacturers of personal computers are foreign; [f]oreign com-
petition exists even for the most powerful supercomputers-3 Japanese compa-
nies (Hitachi, NEC, and Fujitsu) manufacture half of the top 25 most powerful
computers in the world.
Id.
223. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 1 (stating that European, Japanese, Taiwan-
ese, and South Korean producers will capture 22% of the global computer market by
2000).
1006 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:975
that exist in the United States.224 Thus, foreign competitors are able to
seize opportunities to penetrate emerging markets, such as in Russia and
China, while U.S. producers sit at bay watching potential opportunities
slip away.225
2. An Attempt to Provide a Level Playing Field
The Clinton Administration seeks to place U.S. producers on a level
playing field with competitors by increasing the CTP levels for Computer
Tiers 2 and 3 countries, moving several countries to Tier 1, and switching
Romania from Tier 3 to Tier 2.226 The higher CTP levels reflect the con-
tinued technological advancements in the computer industry and the in-
ability of the Department of Commerce to control effectively the sales of
computers below the present CTP levels.
227
224. See id. (noting that many countries do not have reexport controls); see also Stein-
brecher, supra note 38, at 688-91 (discussing the effects of self-imposed hindrances on U.S.
exports). But see THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 13 (noting that Japanese and German
producers, who directly compete with U.S. producers for high performance computer
sales, are subject to national laws that afford similar levels of protection as do U.S. export
control laws).
225. Cf. Bob Davis & Helene Cooper, White House to Loosen Curbs on Export of
Computers to China, Other Nations, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1999, at A24 (quoting Rhett
Dawson, president of Information Technology Industry Council, as saying, "[flailure to
update the current thresholds will result in a loss of competitiveness for U.S. computer
companies as they lose important markets to foreign competition"). But see THE
DECISION, supra note 107, at 12 (commenting that subsidiaries of U.S. companies domi-
nate foreign markets for general computer technology, and identifying only two global
competitors for high-end computer systems). The GAO report indicates also that U.S.
competitors sold only a small amount of high performance computers to Computer Tier 3
countries, thus implying that U.S. producers are not losing out on market opportunities to
competitors. See id.
226. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 2-3 (statement by William Daley, Secretary
of Commerce) (commenting that the President's decision to relax computer export con-
trols will ensure that the United States remains competitive in the global marketplace).
227. See High Performance Computer Export Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Int'l Sec., Proliferation, and Fed. Serv., 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL
18088462, at *1-*2 (statement of William Reinsch, Under Secretary, Export Administra-
tion, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Reinsch Computer Testimony] (commenting
on the problems posed by technological developments in attempts to control the prolifera-
tion of high performance computers). Under Secretary Reinsch identified four factors
that cause difficulties in controlling the proliferation of high performance computers. See
id. at 1. First, rapid advancements in microchip technology will lead to the mass produc-
tion of microchips capable of 2000 MTOPS by the end of 1999. See id. at 2-3. Second,
other technological advancements, including increased sophistication of software and in-
terconnect technologies, permit end-users to "cluster" together several low-end systems to
give a higher CTP level. See id. at 3. Third, manufacturers are building computer plat-
forms that are easily upgraded. See id. (referring to the attainable performance or scal-
ability of a computer). Therefore, a buyer can purchase a computer with a CTP threshold
level permitted by U.S. export control laws and upgrade easily to 5000 or 6000 MTOPS or
2000] Liberalization of High Performance Computer Export Controls
a. Technological Advancements Charge Ahead of Export Controls
The continued advancement of computer technology 2  places pressure
on export controls. 29  Department of Commerce Secretary, William
Daley, highlighted this pressure in a July 1, 1999 press conference when
he warned that, absent changes to export control laws, export controls
would subject a Sony Playstation to control.2  To avoid the absurdity of
controlling a video game system, the Clinton Administration increased
the CTP levels for Computer Tier 3 countries from 2000 MTOPS to 6500
MTOPS for military end-users and from 7000 MTOPS to 12,300 MTOPS
for commercial end-users.2'
b. Controllability of High Performance Computers
Difficulty with respect to control provoked the Clinton Administration
to raise the level for Computer Tier 3 countries to 6500 MTOPS in July
1 9 9 9 .f2 Administration officials note that commercial chips are expected
to increase from 2500 to over 5000 MTOPS by the end of the year 2000.z3
These microprocessors are shipped by the millions throughout the
world . In addition, technological advancements such as parallel proc-
essing, interconnect technologies, and scalability contribute to the diffi-
culties in controlling computer technology.235 Consequently, the Clinton
Administration concluded that it could not prevent U.S. adversaries from
acquiring high performance computer technology below a CTP level of
6500 MTOPS.236 Critics of the Administration's policies balk at this line
more once the computer reaches the destination country. See id.
228. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 1 (explaining that advances in microproces-
sors have significantly improved performance levels). Single microchips increased to over
5000 MTOPS. See id.
229. See id. at 1-2 (stating that technological advancements are aggravating the effi-
cacy of export controls).
230. See id. at 2-3.
231. See Davis & Cooper, supra note 225, at A24; see also supra note 192 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Clinton Administration's proposal to increase further MTOP
levels for computer exports to Computer Tier 3 countries).
232. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 1-2 (stating that the President, Vice Presi-
dent, and the National Security Council agree that it is not possible to control the export
of computers below 6500 MTOPS).
233. See id. at 1 (discussing the latest developments in computer technology); February
Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 1 (predicting that individual chips would be available for
commercial sales by late 2000).
234. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 1-2 (noting that U.S. producers sold over
twenty-one million laptops, servers, and PCs containing these microprocessors to Europe
and Asia alone in 1997).
235. See Reinsch Computer Testimony, supra note 227, at 1.
236. See Press Briefing, supra note 220, at 2.
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117of reasoning.
C. Are Business Interests Dictating Export Controls at the Expense of
National Security?
Proponents of national security interests contend that the Clinton
Administration is jeopardizing national security in favor of business in-
terests.238 Critics even imply that campaign contributions from high tech-
nology industries influenced the Clinton Administration to amend export
control laws in favor of business interests3 9 The influence of campaign
contributions aside, other critics assert that the Administration's export
control policies do not consider adequately the military applications of
high performance computers. In addition, critics argue that the Ad-
237. See generally Amy Kaslow, Arms Control v. Saving Jobs, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1994, at 11 (reporting on the criticisms of the Clinton Administration's
decision to liberalize export controls).
238. See Chinese Access to Dual-Use and Military Technology: Hearing Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., 105th Cong. 113, 119 (1998) (statement of Dr. Peter M. Leitner)
[hereinafter Leitner Testimony] (stating that the United States "scrapp[ed] national secu-
rity controls in favor of market share"); U.S. Supercomputer Export Control Policy: Hear-
ing Before the House Nat'l Sec. Comm., 105th Cong. 65 (1997) (statement by Dr. Stephen
D. Bryen, Former Director, Defense Technology Security Administration) [hereinafter
Bryen Testimony] (criticizing the Clinton Administration's reckless policy as pushing ex-
port sales at the expense of security); Peter H. Stone, High-Tech's High Anxiety, 30 NAT'L
J. 2926, 2927 (1998) (quoting Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN) as stating "'the process is
rigged in favor of the pro-export side of the ledger and opposed to national security"').
Dr. Leitner testified that the Administration's policies will impart to potential adversaries
and proliferators the ability to design, model, prototype, and develop weapons of mass
destruction. See Leitner Testimony, supra, at 113. But see Press Briefing, supra note 220,
at 3-4 (statement of John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense) (reassuring the public that
the Administration extensively reviewed all security concerns and concluded that the
August 3, 1999 amendments did not jeopardize U.S. national security).
239. See Leitner Testimony, supra note 238, at 113 (stating that the Clinton Admini-
stration's push to liberalize export controls is "widely seen as a pay off for generous cam-
paign support and contributions"); see also Stone, supra note 238, at 2928 (implying that
President Clinton advocated regulatory changes benefiting the high technology industry as
a result of political support and contributions). President Clinton appointed heads of the
Departments of Commerce and Defense, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, that
were sympathetic to industry desires to increase exports. See id. In fact, then Secretary of
Defense William Perry announced in 1994 that curbing dual-use exports was a "hopeless
task." Id. (commenting that former Secretary Perry's view led to the dissolution of Co-
Coin). But see Press Conference with Members of the House Select Comm. on U.S. Nat'l
Sec. and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (visited Feb.
19, 2000) <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/doc> (May 25, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Robert Scott (D-VA)) [hereinafter Press Conference] (observing that government wit-
nesses who testified before the U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns
with the People's Republic of China Select Committee responded universally that no po-
litical pressure influenced their decision to change export controls).
240. See, e.g., THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 6-7 (discussing the Administration's
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ministration is pursuing a reckless policy of increasing CTP threshold
levels, despite inadequate mechanisms to prevent the diversion of such
higher performing computers to U.S. adversaries. 4' Moreover, critics
maintain that the Administration did not pursue other alternatives that
pose less risk to U.S. national security, such as tightening multilateral
controls on computers through either Wassenaar or an international
agreement similar to the Supercomputer Control Regime. 242
1. Deficient Studies Result in an Arbitrary Decision-Making Process
In 1995, the Center for International Security and Arms Control at
Stanford University conducted a study on behalf of the Clinton Admini-
stration to analyze computer export controls and recommend an appro-
priate threshold CTP level for export control purposes.243 The Clinton
Administration adopted this study's findings and conclusions,2" which led
eventually to the Administration's decision to liberalize export controls
in 1996,245 and in large part, to its decisions to revise the EAR in July
1999 and February 2000.246
In a 1998 report, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported sev-
eral deficiencies in the Stanford study to Congress.24' First, the study
lacked empirical evidence to support its conclusion that high perform-
ance computers were not controllable based on (1) wide availability'
limited efforts to study the application of high performance computing technology to mili-
tary weaponry).
241. See, e.g., John Maggs, Secrets Shanghaied, 31 NAT'L J. 1454, 1461 (1999) (stating
that the United States cannot verify reliably that the diversion of high performance com-
puters to illegitimate end-users is not preventable).
242. See Stone, supra note 238, at 2927 (discussing national security experts' criticisms
of the Clinton Administration's failure to develop an effective international control re-
gime).
243. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at vi (summarizing the purpose of the re-
port and its key findings).
244. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 2 (summarizing the conclusions of the
Stanford study). The Stanford study concluded that:
(1) U.S.-manufactured computer technology between 4,000 and 5,000 millions of
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) was widely available and uncon-
trollable worldwide, (2) U.S.-manufactured computer technology up to 7,000
MTOPS would become widely available and uncontrollable worldwide by 1997,
and (3) many HPC applications used in U.S. national security programs occur at
about 7,000 MTOPS and at or above 10,000 MTOPS.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted) (describing the key findings of the report).
245. See id. (stating that the Stanford study was a "key element" of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's efforts to revise export controls in 1996).
246. See id. at 4.
247. See id. at 4-7.
248. See id. at 6. According to the GAO, the study concluded that, "without empirical
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249
and (2) inadequate resources to control them. Second, the study did
not review the military applications of high performance computers with
increased CTP levels.
250
Because of these deficiencies in the Stanford study, and the Admini-
stration's subsequent reliance on its findings to revise export controls,
critics argue that the United States is contributing to the proliferation of
military weaponry in countries of national security concern.2 1 In addi-
evidence or analysis," computers from 4000 to 5000 MTOPS were widely available and
that computers with 7000 MTOPS would be just as available by 1997. Id. Furthermore,
the GAO report indicated that the Executive Branch "could not explain nor provide
documentation" as to how it decided to set CTP level at 2000 MTOPS for Computer Tier
3 military end-users, even though the Stanford study concluded that computers with 5000
MTOPS were uncontrollable. Id. In its own review of the market, the GAO report con-
cluded that subsidiaries of U.S. companies dominated the overseas markets. See id. at 12;
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 4 (stating that not once did U.S. produc-
ers lose sales to foreign high performance computer vendors in Computer Tier 3 coun-
tries). In addition, the GAO found that Computer Tier 3 countries had minimal capabili-
ties of their own to produce high performance computers of comparable quantity and
quality, as compared to the major suppliers of these computers, including the United
States, Japan, and Germany. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 5.
249. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 4 (concluding that "the study lacked em-
pirical evidence or analysis to support its conclusion that [high performance computers]
were uncontrollable based on ... insufficient resources").
250. See id. at 7-8 (discussing the limited review by the Stanford Institute of military
applications of high performance computers with an increased CTP level). The Stanford
study authors indicated that they did not assess the military applications of high perform-
ance computers because there was virtually no government data to make such an assess-
ment. See id. at 7. In fact, as of 1998, the Department of Energy's study on the application
of high performance computing in nuclear test simulations and design was the only study
that the Clinton Administration conducted. See CHANGES IN CONTROLS, supra note 41,
at 7. According to the Department of Commerce, even this study did not factor into the
Clinton Administration's decision to revise export controls. See THE DECISION, supra
note 107, at 7. Nevertheless, Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) identified several
other military applications of high performance computing technology, including, "nu-
clear, chemical, and biological weapons, tactical aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, sub-
marines, anti-submarine warfare, command, control, and communications, [and] informa-
tion warfare." Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 102.
251. See, e.g., Maggs, supra note 241, at 1460; Milhollin Testimony, supra note 21, at 30
(highlighting the acquisition of high performance computers by countries that may possi-
bly threaten U.S. national security). Decontrolling export controls, for example, led to the
Indian Institute of Science's acquisition of supercomputers. See id. This institute is India's
main missile research site. See id. In addition, Chinese and Russian nuclear weapon and
missile research laboratories have acquired supercomputing technology from U.S. produc-
ers. See id. As a result, computing power available now to Russia increased by a factor of
ten, and China is capable now of producing the DF-5 intercontinental missile that can
carry nuclear warheads. See id. But see Reinsch Computer Testimony, supra note 227, at 4
(stating that high performance computers are not essential to making military weaponry).
Under Secretary Reinsch explains that computer technology "is not a choke point for mili-
tary production." Id. In other words, acquiring high performance computers alone will
not improve a country's military-industrial capabilities. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES,
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tion, critics contend that U.S. military strategic advantage is therefore
minimized by the proliferation of high performance computing technol-
252ogy.
2. Post-Verification Process Proves Ineffective: Damage Inflicted Once
Computers Leave the United States
The risks associated with the proliferation of more sophisticated com-
puting technology, as a result of relaxing export controls, are com-
pounded by the Executive Branch's inability to prevent the diversion of
computer technology to unauthorized end-users. Once the Depart-
ment of Commerce issues a license, it is virtually impossible to prevent
the commodity's diversion to an unauthorized end-user.254
In 1998, Congress established a post-verification system as an oversight
mechanism to ensure that diversions did not occur.25 As Representative
supra note 110, at 17 (containing a letter from Commerce Secretary Daley, which explains
that once a country acquires a computer over a few hundred MTOPS, the acquisition of
computers with a higher performance level is insignificant for military weaponry develop-
ment). Secretary Daley elaborated in his August, 1998 letter to Harold Johnson of the
GAO, that other factors such as "'skill in software design, access to sophisticated manufac-
turing techniques, experience and test data in weapons design-are much more important
than computer performance."' Id. at 19 (quoting Secretary Daley's letter).
252. See, e.g., Bryen Testimony, supra note 238, at 67 (discussing the marginalization of
U.S. military superiority as a result of supercomputer transfers to U.S. adversaries); see
also U.S. Supercomputer Export Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Nat'l
Sec., 105th Cong. 8 (1997) (statement of Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Counterproliferation Policy, Department of Defense) [hereinafter Wallerstein
Testimony] (stating that export controls on high technology commodities are essential to
maintaining U.S. military superiority). But see Reinsch Speech, supra note 15, at 2-3 (ar-
guing that denying U.S. producers the opportunity to sell supercomputers to countries
such as China would threaten U.S. national security because it would: (1) encourage China
and other countries to produce their own supercomputers, causing the U.S. to lose all con-
trol over supercomputer technology, and (2) effect adversely the strength of the U.S. high
technology industry upon which the U.S. military relies for cutting edge technology for
weaponry systems).
253. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 11 (discussing the limitations of the post-
verification system in preventing diversions). The GAO reported to Congress in 1998 that
the post-verification system is unable to detect physical diversions of computer technology
to unauthorized end-users, is limited by the inexperience of government officials in com-
puter-specific training, and is reduced by the preclusion of U.S. officials from conducting
post-verifications by foreign countries. See id. at 11-12; COx REPORT, supra note 24, at
134-37 (discussing the limitations of the post-verification system to verify the end-user of
commodities exported to China).
254. See Press Conference, supra note 239, at 4 (remarks of Rep. Christopher Cox (R-
CA) (stating that currently the United States does not have a means to prevent high per-
formance computers from being diverted to "third world and rogue states that engage in
unpredictable behavior").
255. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85,
§ 1213, 111 Stat. 1934, 1934-35 (1997).
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Jim Gibbons (R-NV) stated, however, "the policy is one of closing the
door after the cow has got out of the barn." '256 In other words, it is
meaningless to verify the diversion of supercomputers after the fact, be-
cause the unauthorized end-user already possesses the benefits of the
257technology. In response to this problem and the Administration's con-
tinued efforts to relax export controls, public policy makers propose
strengthening the post-verification process."'
3. The United States Takes a Back Seat: Failing to Lead the
International Arena in Establishing Export Controls
Lastly, critics contend that the Administration failed to lead efforts to
control the proliferation and diversion of computers on an international
level.25 9 Critics argue that the United States-a leading producer of high
performance computers in an industry with a limited number of foreign
producers-should lead efforts to strengthen Wassenaar, CoCom's suc-
cessor, or formulate an international agreement similar to the
260
Supercomputer Control Regime.
III. HOW TO STRIKE A BETTER BALANCE
The Clinton Administration's recent EAR revisions respond to tech-
nological innovations in the computer industry and concerns that export
controls will impede an industry vital to both the economic success and
256. U.S. Supercomputer Export Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Nat'l Sec., 105th Cong. 19, 20 (1997) (statement of Rep. Jim Gibbons (R-NV) [hereinafter
Gibbons Testimony] (criticizing the post-verification process).
257. See id.
258. See generally Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 173 (recommending ways to im-
prove the post-verification system with respect to China). The recommendations made by
the Cox Report include: (1) the requirement that China establish an "open and transpar-
ent system" that permits the United States to verify the end-use of commodities, (2) low-
ering the CTP levels of computers allowed for export under current regulations if such a
system is not established, and (3) conducting an independent evaluation of enhancing the
post-verification system. Id.
259. Cf. Leitner Testimony, supra note 238, at 118 (stating that the United States is
taking the lead in the opposite direction by scrapping national security controls in favor of
market share). Dr. Leitner pointed out the United States's irresponsibility on the interna-
tional level that was attributed to the United States's 1998 proposal to decontrol virtually
all telecommunication technology and equipment from Wassenaar controls. See id. at 118-
19; see also Wallerstein Testimony, supra note 252, at 12-13. Deputy Assistant Secretary
Wallerstein explained that the United States has not presented a credible case to other
governments for controlling military sensitive technology in the post Cold War era. See id.
260. See, e.g., S. 1712, 106th Cong. § 607 (1999) (providing provisions to strengthen the
post verification process); see also Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 173 (recommending
strengthening post-verification procedures for computer exports to China).
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national security of the United States."' The Clinton Administration,
however, failed to analyze adequately the implications these reforms
have on U.S. national security interests or minimize the risks associated
with proliferation and diversion of high performance computers.262 To
respond to these shortcomings, the Clinton Administration should take
affirmative steps to establish objective criteria for raising CTP levels,263
enhance the post-verification process,2'6 and strengthen multilateral ex-
265port controls.
A. Establish Objective Criteria: Ending Arbitrary Decisions by
Government Bureaucrats
The 1998 GAO study26 identified a critical weakness in President
Clinton's decision to increase CTP levels in 1996: this decision was made
arbitrarily by bureaucrats within the federal government. 267 The Clinton
Administration claimed that it increased CTP levels after conducting ex-
tensive studies, such as the Stanford study.268 The GAO report con-
cluded, however, that the Stanford study, in and of itself, lacked empiri-
cal evidence and analysis to support its conclusions. 69 There is evidence
to suggest that government officials arbitrarily decided to increase CTP
levels in August 1999 and February 2000 as well.7
261. See White House Eases Limits on Exports of Computers, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., July 2, 1999, at A4 (reporting that an Intel spokesperson stated in response to the
reforms: "this is good progress ... we're encouraged about the president's willingness to
work with Congress in a bipartisan look at a long-term solution"); see also Maibach Testi-
mony, supra note 10, at 5-6 (stating that the computer industry is a vital component of U.S.
economic productivity and protection of U.S. national security interests).
262. Cf THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 14 (concluding that the Stanford study was
inadequate in its analysis of critical issues).
263. See infra notes 266-87 and accompanying text (discussing the arbitrary nature of
the current decision making process and recommending objective criteria to validate the
process).
264. See infra notes 288-305 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations to
improve post-shipment verification).
265. See infra notes 306-17 and accompanying text (recommending that multilateral
export controls be strengthened).
266. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 5-8 (discussing the Stanford study's weak-
ness and President Clinton's subsequent decision to relax export controls).
267. Cf id. at 6 (implying the Administration made decisions arbitrarily, as the Ad-
ministration could not provide empirical support for its decision to revise export controls).
268. See, e.g., Tarbell Letter, supra note 147, reprinted in THE DECISION, supra note
107, at 44 (stating that the Stanford study was just one of many sources contributing to the
decision to revise export controls).
269. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 4; see also supra notes 243-52 and accom-
panying text (discussing the deficiencies of the Stanford study).
270. See generally, Revision of High Performance Computer Licensing Policy, 64 Fed.
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Moreover, the Administration has not conducted appropriate studies
to determine the potential military application of computers with a
higher CTP level."' The sole study to date analyzes the application of
high performance computers with only regard to nuclear weapons tech-
nology." Previously, the Department of Defense identified that high
performance computers have numerous other strategic military applica-
tions;273 however, no threat assessment studies were undertaken to de-
termine the impact of increasing CTP levels on these military applica-
tions.274
The Clinton Administration should work with Congress to develop
objective criteria to determine the appropriate CTP levels.275 Objective
criteria should be established for the following areas: (1) the foreign
availability of high performance computers at various CTP levels, (2) the
cost to government to regulate export controls,276 (3) the economic im-
pact on the computer industry,77 (4) a threat assessment of increasing
CTP levels on the U.S. national security interests, and (5) the potential
for multilateral control.278
Reg. 42009, 42010 (1999) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 738, 740, 742) (contending
that the decision to raise the advanced notification threshold to 6500 reflects the wide
commercial availability of computers at this level). But see NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES,
supra note 110, at 3 (concluding that high performance computers over 2000 MTOPS are
not widely available without restriction from foreign sources).
271. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 7.
272. See NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 7 (commenting that, with
the exception of the Department of Energy study that reviews the application of high per-
formance computing technology in nuclear weapons programs, the executive branch has
identified no other military application of such technology).
273. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 102 (listing examples of other military appli-
cations of computer technology).
274. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 7-8 (stating that the U.S. Department of
Defense did not conduct a threat assessment because it was not asked to); see also Bryen
Testimony, supra note 238, at 65-66 (stating that the defense department has not evaluated
the impact of technology transfers to countries, such as China, on U.S. national security).
275. See generally July Fact Sheet, supra note 174, at 3 (stating that the Administration
intends to work with Congress to develop an export control approach "that does not rely
on ad hoc judgements about appropriate levels of control").
276. For a general discussion on the costs involved with imposing export controls, see
Steinbrecher, supra note 38, at 688-91 (summarizing the costs to businesses and the federal
government with respect to the imposition of export controls on high performance com-
puters).
277. See Export Administration Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate Bank-
ing, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 20009405, at *2-
*3 (statement of Karen Murphy, Applied Materials, on behalf of Semiconductor Equip-
ment and Materials International) [hereinafter Murphy Testimony] (stating that govern-
ment regulators must take into account the cost of export controls on the high technology
industry with respect to lost sales and research and development revenues).
278. See, e.g., THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 15 (recommending similar objective
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The development of objective criteria for assessing the potential
threats of increasing CTP levels will require the Clinton Administration
to conduct additional studies, beyond reviewing the application of high
performance computers to nuclear weapons technology.279 The studies
must determine the application of high performance computers in other
military weaponry. 2  The importance of these studies lies in determining
the proper threshold at which computers with increased CTP levels risk
U.S. national security 8' The following questions must be answered to
reach such a determination: (1) What are the potential military applica-
tions of high performance computers with "X" CTP level?282 (2) If the
high performance computers with a "X" CTP level are either legally ex-
ported or illegally diverted to foreign military end-users and used for
"Y" military system, can the United States maintain its military superi-
ority over its adversaries armed with "X" CTP level technology? 3 (3)
How far is the United States willing to allow the military superiority gap
to close?2 (4) What are the likely costs, in real dollar terms, of main-
taining U.S. superiority if "X" CTP level computers are exported to U.S.
adversaries? 285
criteria). The GAO recommends that the Department of Defense conduct an analysis of
the national security impact posed by exports of high performance computers to countries
with national security and proliferation concerns. See id. The GAO recommends that this
assessment respond to the following questions: "(1) how and at what performance levels
countries of concern use HPCs for military modernization and proliferation Activities; (2)
the threat of such uses to U.S. national security interests; and (3) the extent to which such
HPCs are controllable." Id.
279. See, e.g., Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 172 (calling for legislation to require the
Executive Branch to conduct comprehensive studies on the application of high perform-
ance computing, clustering, and parallel processing technology in national security applica-
tions).
280. See id. at 102 (noting there are several other military applications that utilize high
performance computing technology).
281. See, e.g., THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 15 (recommending that the Secretar-
ies of Defense, Energy, and State, as well as the Director of the U.S. Arms Control Dis-
armament Agency, jointly evaluate and develop options to safeguard U.S. national secu-
rity interests with respect to high performance computing technology); see also Cox
REPORT, supra note 24, at 173 (recommending the intelligence community conduct an an-
nual threat assessment of exporting high performance computers to China).
282. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 15 (recommending assessments of how and
what performance levels countries of security concern use high performance computing
technology to modernize or develop military weaponry).
283. See generally Wallerstein Testimony, supra note 252; see also supra note 252 and
accompanying text (noting that export controls are essential to maintaining U.S. military
superiority).
284. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
285. Cf Cupitt Testimony, supra note 23, at 1 (maintaining that export controls are a
relatively low cost means of preventing the proliferation of military sensitive technology).
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The answers to these questions will allow policymakers to reach a well-
informed decision before increasing CTP levels. 28 The questions con-
sider potential military application of the technology exported, the im-
portance of maintaining U.S. military superiority, and the reality of
spending limitations for defense purposes.287
B. A Post-Verification System
Once a well-informed decision is made to export high performance
computers abroad, government officials must possess an effective means
to verify that the exported commodity is used for the purpose specified
by the license application, and is not diverted illegally to unauthorized
end-users.2m The current system, however, is vulnerable to criticism. 2 9
Strengthening the post-verification process also depends upon on a
number of factors. First, the Department of Commerce must train gov-
ernment officials adequately to conduct post-verification reviews.29 Sec-
ond, licensing officers must be involved in the post-verification process. 9'
Currently, there is no connection between those officers that place condi-
tions on license applications and those that actually conduct the post-
verification of high performance computers exported under the license
application 92 This permits license approval even though government of-
ficials lack adequate information with respect to an exporter's compli-
291ance history.
286. See supra notes 266-274 and accompanying text (discussing the deficiencies in the
prior decision making process).
287. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text (presenting questions for consid-
eration prior to raising CTP levels).
288. See generally Department of Commerce's Export Licensing Process: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL
20009198 (statement of Johnnie E. Frazier, Acting Inspector General, Department of
Commerce) [hereinafter Frazier Testimony] (stating that post verification reviews contrib-
ute to the regulation of exported commodities by providing assurance that exporters,
shippers, consignees, and end-users comply with the licensing provisions); see also S. REP.
No. 106-180, at 17 (1999) (stating that post-shipment verifications are important to the
United States's enforcement efforts).
289. See Gibbons Testimony, supra note 256, at 19-20 (emphasizing that the post-
verification process provides marginal utility in preventing the diversion of high perform-
ance computers to countries of national security concern).
290. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 11 (commenting that government officials
cannot determine the specific end-use of a high performance computer because the offi-
cials lack computer-specific training).
291. See Frazier Testimony, supra note 288, at 15 (discussing the implications of not
involving licensing officers in the post-verification process).
292. See id.
293. See id. (pointing out that the licensing officials cannot make well-informed deci-
sions when determining whether to issue a license because there is insufficient information
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Third, Congress must provide the Department of Commerce with the
means to conduct adequate verifications by funding additional investiga-
tors to conduct verification proceedings.294  Fourth, the Department of
Commerce must negotiate agreements with foreign countries to permit
U.S. investigators to conduct on-site inspections.29 ' As suggested by the
Cox Committee,' 96 the United States should require post-shipment verifi-
cations as part of U.S. trade terms with foreign countries. 9 Without
country access, the post-shipment verification process is useless because
U.S. investigators cannot do their jobs. Finally, the United States
should cooperate and enter agreements with allied nations to develop
joint verification efforts.299
The implementation of these recommendations will not escape the
criticism that post-shipment verifications identify illegal diversions and
unauthorized uses after the fact.9 ° Critics must remember, however, that
post-shipment verifications are only one element within the Department
with respect to an applicant's compliance history).
294. See S. REP. No. 106-180, at 17 (1999) (noting the inadequacy of resources avail-
able to conduct post-shipment verifications). There is currently only one investigator
posted overseas. See id. As a result, the Department of Commerce relies on foreign serv-
ice nationals and personal services contractors to conduct on-site checks. See Frazier Tes-
timony, supra note 288, at 16. Senator Gramm's Senate Bill 1712 proposes to allocate $4.5
million in additional resources to fund ten Office of Export Enforcement investigators in
China, Russia, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, Egypt, Taiwan, and other posts. See S. REP.
No. 106-80, at 17.
295. See THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 11 (explaining that countries, such as
China, United Kingdom, Germany, and France have forbidden U.S. investigators from
conducting post-shipment verifications). With respect to the United Kingdom, Germany,
and France, these countries conduct their own verification and provide U.S. officials with
the results. See id. at 11-12. China finally agreed to allow the United States to conduct
post-shipment verifications in June, 1998. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 134. The
People's Republic of China placed multiple conditions on the verifications thus rendering
the agreement useless. See id. at 134-35 (listing the non-classified PRC conditions of the
U.S.-China agreement for post-shipment verifications).
296. The "Cox Committee," formally known as the Select Committee on U.S. Na-
tional Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,
investigated China's theft of classified design information on the United States's advanced
thermonuclear weapons. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at ii (providing the declassified
version of the Cox Committee Report that encompasses the Committee's findings and
recommendations with respect to the theft of United States's nuclear weapon secrets).
297. See Press Conference, supra note 238, at 3 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cox
(R-CA)) (stating that the Select Committee agreed unanimously to include an end-use
verification in the terms of trade with foreign countries).
298. Cf THE DECISION, supra note 107, at 11.
299. See generally Cupitt Testimony, supra note 23, at 3-4 (stating that the United
States should negotiate with other countries to increase enforcement efforts and to allo-
cate additional resources to post-shipment verifications).
300. See, e.g., Gibbons Testimony, supra note 256, at 19-20 (criticizing the post-
shipment verification process).
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of Commerce's arsenal to prevent the diversion and unauthorized use of
high performance computers.30 1 Pre-license checks of both exporters and
end-users and tough penalties for export violators provide additional as-
surances that exporters and end-users comply with U.S. export laws.3 °2
Post-shipment verifications round out U.S. export enforcement op-
tions.0 3 By strengthening post-shipment verification proceedings, the
United States can continue its enforcement efforts long after the com-
modity leaves the U.S. borders3 ° In addition, an effective post-shipment
verification process imposes a greater responsibility on U.S. exporters in
choosing its customers wisely, and ensures enforcement action should
customers use or divert higher performance computers to unauthorized
end-users or end-uses."5
C. Asserting U.S. Leadership to Strengthen Multilateral Controls
The final element in striking a better balance between national security
and economic interests is the need for the United States to exercise its
leadership in the international arena to establish effective multilateral
controls on high performance computers.3°  The dissolution of CoCom
dismantled effective multilateral controls on exports.3 CoCom's succes-
sor, Wassenaar, is severely limited as an effective multilateral control re-
gime because of the discretionary implementation of multilateral con-
trols and Wassenaar's diverse membership, which includes countries such
301. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1994) (sub-
jecting exporters to both criminal and civil penalties for. violating U.S. export laws); see
also Procedures for Processing License Applications, 15 C.F.R. § 750.4 (1999) (providing
procedures for a pre-license check).
302. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 750.4 (1999).
303. Cf S. REP. No. 106-180, at 17 (1999) (stressing that post-shipment verifications
are an important element of enforcement efforts).
304. Cf. Frazier Testimony, supra note 288, at 16.
305. See generally id. at 16.
306. See Stone, supra note 145, at 2931 (quoting Dr. Peter Leitner as stating that the
United States "must take the lead in building a tougher, international export control op-
eration"); Export Administration Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 106th
Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 20009262, at *24 (statement of H. Seymour, President,
Cincinnati Machine: A Unova Company, on Behalf of the Association for Manufacturing
Technology) (calling on the Administration to strengthen the Wassenaar agreement);
Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 173 (recommending that the United States assert greater
leadership to assure that other computer manufacturing countries adopt export controls
similar to the United States).
307. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing the dissolution of Co-
Corn and effects on multilateral controls).
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as Russia that pose a national security concern to the United States.3 °8
Nonetheless, the United States should address these limitations by
leading a multilateral effort to reinstitutionalize the "teeth" that existed
under CoCom. In other words, Wassenaar should function as a review
and approval regime for specified commodities listed by member na-
tionsY'0 Commentators warn, however, that strengthening Wassenaar is
not an easy task because of the widely divergent views on security
threats.310
As such, an alternative measure would be for the United States to en-
ter agreements, separate and apart from Wassenaar, to establish a com-
puter control regime similar to the Supercomputer Control Regime es-
tablished in the 1980s between the United States and Japan."' An
expansion of the Supercomputer Control Regime may provide a better
opportunity to strike an agreement because there are far fewer high per-
formance computer-producing countries compared to members of Was-
312senaar.
By strengthening multilateral export controls, the potential exists to
enhance the United States's national security and economy.313 On one
hand, multilateral controls level the playing field among competing pro-
ducers of higher performance computers by eliminating advantages cre-
ated by inequities in unilateral export controls."' U.S. producers that
sacrificed their competitiveness for the sake of national security would
possess the same opportunities to compete in foreign markets as their
308. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary im-
plementation of multilateral export controls); see also Computer Tier 3, 15 C.F.R. §
740.7(d)(1) (1999) (listing Russia on the Computer Tier 3 list that includes countries of
national security concern).
309. See Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 12, 15 (explaining the differences between
CoCom and Wassenaar with respect to the review and approval of military sensitive tech-
nology exports).
310. See Hoydysh Testimony, supra note 183, at 12; see also Stokes, supra note 210, at
1475 (noting that European countries do not consider China as a security threat, but the
United States does).
311. Cf Cox REPORT, supra note 24, at 173 (recommending that the Executive
Branch pursue agreements with other computer-producing countries to develop uniform
export controls with respect to China).
312. See Wassenaar Members, supra note 141, at 1 (noting that there are currently 33
members to Wassenaar); NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 110, at 4-6 (discussing
the limited number of countries that are capable of producing higher performance com-
puter technology).
313. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of multilat-
eral controls).
314. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse effect of
unilateral controls on U.S. producers).
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competitors.315 On the other hand, multilateral controls enhance national
security by restricting military sensitive technology to countries of na-
tional security concern."' Absent such controls, the efforts made by in-
dividual countries to control computer technology are undermined and
there is a greater risk that countries posing a national security risk will
acquire military sensitive technology."7
IV. CONCLUSION
The Clinton Administration's recent amendments to the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations highlight the struggle among policymakers to
strike the proper balance between economic and national security inter-
ests. Implicit in this balance is the need for a dynamic export control
policy that is flexible enough to change with the economic, technological,
and political climate of the day.
The recent regulatory changes in export law also reflect the concerns
over the strength of the U.S. economy; in particular, the strength of U.S.
exports in foreign markets. To address these concerns, the reforms seek
to remove overly burdensome regulations that impede U.S. industries
from competing with foreign producers. The Clinton Administration and
Congress, however, need to take critical steps to ensure that business in-
terests do not override national security concerns. These critical first
steps should include further analysis of the military applications of high
performance computers, creation of objective criteria for increasing CTP
levels, enhancement of the post-verification process, and the establish-
ment of effective multilateral export controls.
315. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. producers were
unable to compete in foreign markets because U.S. export control laws forbid the exporta-
tion of higher performance computers to specified controlled countries).
316. See, e.g., GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 1 (commenting on the CoCom's
effectiveness in preventing the acquisition of military sensitive technology by non-CoCom
members).
317. See Murphy Testimony, supra note 277, at 2 (noting that unilateral export controls
are ineffective); see also Stone, supra note 238, at 2931 (quoting Ashton B. Carter, a pro-
fessor of science and international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School
of Government, as stating "[tihere's no point in us controlling things if our partners
don't[;] ... [f]or dual-use exports, it's crucial to have international consensus").
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